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Executive summary
The value and necessity of demand response as a flexi-
bility means has been widely recognised among stake-
holders and policy makers in Europe (e.g. EC, 2011a, 
2012a, 2012b; Smart Grids Task Force, 2013; ENTSO-
E, 2012b). The gradual roll-out of smart meters at resi-
dential level and the deployment of smart grids are ex-
pected to provide the hardware for demand response. 
Demand response also requires the active participa-
tion of consumers, who are rather passive nowadays. 
There are two paths for consumers towards becoming 
active demand response participants: a gradual drift 
during a potentially long period, or a timely shift fol-
lowing proactive actions from the government, regu-
lators and market players to engage consumers. This 
report assesses how to realise this shift towards active 
consumers using a consumer-centred approach and 
does so from the perspective of contracts, as active 
demand response is mediated through contracts be-
tween consumers and intermediaries. 
Chapter 1 sets the scene by introducing the context 
in which we perform our analysis and the main issues 
that need to be taken into account when aiming at the 
full activation of demand response. Within this chap-
ter, we justify the consumer-centred approach of the 
report and the importance of contracts in engaging 
consumers to participate in active demand response.
Chapter 2 explores the issue of the range of contracts 
required for active demand response. We develop a 
consumer categorisation method which allows tak-
ing into account both the technical potential and the 
willingness of consumers to participate in demand re-
sponse. We demonstrate that there is a need for an ad-
equate range of contracts to reflect different consumer 
categories. Furthermore, we identify the challenges 
in contract selection and then move on to measures 
which could facilitate the selection process. 
Chapter 3 explores the issue of the impact of inter-
mediaries on consumers by analysing their incentive-
based business model. Such impact is twofold. First, 
different intermediaries might be incentivised to fa-
cilitate or take up some but not all demand response 
services. Second, their ability to capture the full value 
of demand response services and incentives to share 
this value with consumers can also differ. Our evalu-
ation shows that there is no clear best intermediary, 
but the coexistence of different intermediaries can in-
crease the competition, ensure an adequate range of 
contracts, and enhance the benefit sharing with con-
sumers. Furthermore, we identify what may hinder an 
adequate range of intermediaries and propose possi-
ble safeguard measures and remedies.  
In both Chapters 2 and 3 the analysis has been under-
taken within the current retail market design in Eu-
rope, which is characterised by a substantial reliance 
on TSOs in balancing the electricity market transac-
tions. Chapter 4 exposes the consequences of such a 
market design, and demonstrates that a real shift to-
wards active demand response requires a major con-
ceptual shift in how we think about electricity mar-
kets: consumers need to be recognised as a source of 
flexibility for the electricity system and they need to 
be encouraged to become active providers of flexibil-
ity. Therefore, policy of empowerment and protection 
should be designed as such that consumers must be 
empowered to play a new role and at the same time 
must not be overly protected if this would prevent 
them from taking up this role.
Chapter 5 draws out a number of recommendations 
for action at EU level based on the conclusions on 
consumer empowerment and protection (Chapter 2) 
and retail market design (Chapter 3). The timing for 
the implementation of these actions is also identified.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Context 
Traditionally, electricity systems are operated on the 
basis that the supply is adjusted to follow the load in 
real-time; meaning that the flexibility to maintain 
balance between electric power supply and demand 
is mostly provided by the generation side, which is 
dominated by centralised, large-scale flexibly dis-
patchable (fossil fuel and hydro based) power plants.
Nowadays, the European electricity systems are 
evolving towards a generation mix that is more de-
centralised, less predictable and less flexible to op-
erate due to the large-scale integration of renewable 
and distributed energy sources in order to meet the 
20-20-20 targets (EC, 2009a, 2010c). Some countries 
even target a higher share of renewables in the elec-
tric power supply (e.g. Germany, 80% by 2050 (Bun-
destag, 2012), the Netherlands, 37% (NREAP, 2010) 
and Spain, 40% (NREAP, 2010) by 2020). In this con-
text, additional flexibility is expected to be provided 
by the demand side (Figure 1).	
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	
			
			
				
	
		
	
 			
Figure 1. Paradigm shift of electricity system operation – demand as sources of flexibility  
Source: own depiction
Indeed, in the short run, demand response can make 
balancing easier by shifting demand to times when 
there is more renewable power available and it can 
help manage congestion by peak-shaving; thus, help-
ing the integration of renewable energy sources in the 
electricity system and reducing the high operation 
costs of flexible generation units. In the long run, this 
operational value of demand response can lead to re-
duced or postponed investments in network rein-
forcement and flexible thermal generation, and to less 
investment to meet decarbonisation targets as the 
electricity system is used more efficiently. 
This value and necessity of demand response as a 
means of flexibility has been recognised widely among 
stakeholders and policy makers in Europe. For exam-
ple: ‘Active participation of the users connected to the 
grid is of crucial importance to keep the system balance 
between generation and demand and considering at the 
same time grid inherent constraints. Consumers are the 
key stakeholders on the electricity demand side, and can 
play a role on the electricity supply side too (prosum-
ers)’ (ETP SmartGrids, 2012). The Energy Efficiency 
Directive of 2012 considers demand response to be 
‘an important instrument […] to take action on con-
sumption and billing information and thus provides a 
2Final Report – June 2013
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mechanism to reduce or shift consumption, resulting in 
energy savings in both final consumption and, through 
the more optimal use of networks and generation as-
sets, in energy generation, transmission and distribu-
tion’ (EC, 2012b). The Internal Market Communica-
tion calls for ‘stronger demand response in distribution 
networks’ (EC, 2012a). The Smart Grids Task Force’s 
mission statement points out the changing role of the 
consumer: ‘consumer empowerment and the engage-
ment of energy market participants through the use 
of new technology will contribute towards a paradigm 
shift in the operation of the internal energy market’ and 
‘smart grids can be a useful tool in enabling consum-
ers to take action to more effectively manage their en-
ergy consumption’ (EC, 2011b). In its energy policy 
for consumers, the Commission adds that with smart 
grids present, consumers can become more active 
players in the market (EC, 2010a), and these smart 
electricity grids are seen as a key challenge for ac-
commodating massive integration of renewable and 
decentralised energy sources in the Strategic Energy 
Technology plan (EC, 2007a). 
In fact, empowering consumers to be active partici-
pants in the electricity markets is also put forward as a 
policy goal itself. In the Third Package directive on the 
internal electricity market, it is stated that ‘the imple-
mentation of intelligent metering systems […] shall assist 
the active participation of consumers in the electricity 
supply market’ (EC, 2009c). Additionally, the Energy 
Efficiency Directive demands that advanced metering 
infrastructure takes into account a more active con-
sumer/prosumer (e.g. with regard to data provision 
to consumers or minimum functionalities of enabling 
infrastructure that could benefit the consumer) (EC, 
2012b). The European Regulators and European Con-
sumer Organisation state, in their joint vision on en-
ergy customers for 2020, that ‘responsibilities shift and 
consumers are increasingly expected to become more ac-
tive in energy markets’ (CEER and BEUC, 2012). 
In contrast to the wide consensus on the value and 
necessity of demand response in smart grids, there is 
little consensus on how to engage consumers or align 
industry incentives. There are several challenges for 
demand response to play its expected role of flexibil-
ity provider. First, there is lively debate on the role 
of different actors, incumbent (TSO, DSO, suppliers, 
etc.) or emergent (aggregators, manufacturers of ap-
pliances and devices, retailers in other sectors than 
electricity, ICT companies), in the organisation of 
smart grids and demand response (e.g. CEER, 2011a; 
Smart Grids Task Force, 2013; Ruester et al., 2013b). 
The split incentives of intermediaries and the distri-
bution of value of demand response along the value 
chain explain the difficulty to reach consensus on 
the appropriate business model for demand response 
(Consumer Focus, 2013a). Indeed, if the whole value 
were to be passed on to the responding consumers, 
industry would not be engaged, and if industry did 
not pass sufficient value to the consumers, the latter 
would not participate in demand response. A sec-
ond challenge exists in the roll-out of smart appli-
ances and enabling advanced metering infrastructure 
(smart meter). A recent survey of pilot studies on de-
mand response demonstrates that smart appliances 
and enabling infrastructure significantly improve 
the responsiveness of consumers to dynamic price 
signals (Faruqui et al., 2013). Yet, there appears to be 
a chicken-and-egg problem: without the infrastruc-
ture, smart appliances and demand response cannot 
be used to their expected potential and without de-
mand response through smart appliances, the limited 
benefits of the enabling infrastructure do not justify 
the costs of its roll-out (Smart-A, 2009a; EA Technol-
ogy, 2011; ETP SmartGrids, 2011). Furthermore, the 
minimum functionalities for these smart technolo-
gies to ensure their added value for consumers are 
not yet firmly established; instead being part of a Eu-
ropean Commission Recommendation (EC, 2012c). 
Several mandates to standardise appliances and in-
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frastructure to ensure its interoperability are still on-
going: M/441 for utility meters (EC, 2009b), M/468 
for electric vehicles (EC, 2010d) and M/490 for smart 
grids (EC, 2011c). Current research also focuses on 
how consumers can offer demand response with their 
current and future smart appliances (Smart-A, 2008; 
Sustainability First, 2012a) and what the benefits 
could be for the electricity system (Smart-A, 2009b; 
Sustainability First, 2012b). 
While these studies and a number of on-going pilot 
projects provide valuable insights on what consumers 
can offer when they participate in demand response 
programmes and what the benefits and barriers are 
for the incumbent and emerging electricity market 
actors, we observed that they either implicitly or ex-
plicitly treat the consumer primarily as an object of 
changing consumption patterns for financial incen-
tives (e.g. Braithwait and Kirsch, 2006; Frontier Eco-
nomics, 2012). 
This implicit assumption of passiveness of consum-
ers would lead to a gradual drift to demand response. 
Drift means to wait for consumers to become more 
active spontaneously, if and when they become aware 
of the financial incentives that are designed for them 
from a top-down perspective. It will take time, and 
current pilot studies, with some exceptions, are not 
very encouraging (CER, 2011; Frontier Economics 
and Sustainability First, 2012; Redpoint Energy and 
Element Energy, 2012; Stromback et al. 2011).
Nevertheless, demand response will always depend 
on the engagement of consumers. Considering other 
liberalised sectors, such as telecommunication, trans-
port and health care, in which consumers are taking 
a more and more active role in managing their con-
sumption patterns and the associated risks, it could 
be expected that the same activeness could happen in 
the electricity sector. Indeed, if the expected potential 
of demand response is to be realised and the antici-
pated wider system gains are to be achieved, consum-
ers need to become more active and start to make de-
liberate decisions about their consumption patterns.
The activeness or engagement of consumers will al-
low a shift towards demand response. In this option, 
government, regulators, and both incumbent and 
emerging market players must take proactive steps 
to assist consumers in becoming aware of what de-
mand response implies for them in terms of benefits 
and costs, to empower them with necessary tools 
and knowledge to actively participate in demand re-
sponse. To date, this dimension of demand response 
remains relatively under researched; yet empowering 
and engaging consumers to make the transition from 
passive to active can be considered a major challenge 
for successful demand response take-off (Lewis et al., 
2012; Delmas et al., 2013).
1.2  Scope and analytical approach
This report takes a consumer-centred approach, in-
vestigating how the consumer1 can or could partici-
pate in demand response and how to shift to active 
demand response participation.
First, the scope of the analysis is defined as follows:
First, we focus on consumers (and prosum-
ers, who consume and generate electricity) 
connected with the distributed system level, 
meaning residential and Small and Medi-
um-sized Enterprise (SME) consumers, 
hereafter ‘consumers’, because industrial con-
1  Throughout the report, consumer refers to any natural 
or legal person buying electricity whose consumption is mea-
sured by a single meter. A consumer can then be a single person, 
a household, a commercial business, a school, etc.
4Final Report – June 2013
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sumers, given their size and skills and facing 
less market barriers and transaction costs 
than residential and SME consumers, already 
have the possibility to be active today if they 
want to; even if industrial demand response 
is often still limited (Sustainability First, 
2012c). Furthermore, the establishment of a 
well-functioning retail market for electricity 
cannot rely on active industrial consumers 
solely, while the majority of retail consum-
ers remain passive. Bearing in mind that in-
dustrial consumers and residential and SME 
consumers are very different, we draw les-
sons and insights from the industrial experi-
ence with participation in demand response.
Second, we focus on active demand re-
sponse, defined in this report as ‘changes in 
electric usage implemented directly or indi-
rectly by end-use customers/prosumers from 
their current/normal consumption/injection 
patterns in response to certain signals’. This 
definition implies that (1) we only look at 
consumers acting voluntarily, excluding de-
mand response that is mandatory or without 
any compensation; and (2) we do not con-
sider stand-alone generators on the distribu-
tion level as they are not consumers. Further-
more, we highlight the distinction between 
‘demand response’ and ‘energy efficiency’: the 
latter is about using less energy while main-
taining the level of end-use services, whereas 
demand response also implies using more 
electric power when the electricity system is 
in need of such a response, e.g. when wind 
power is abundantly available.
Third, this report does not attempt to quan-
titatively estimate the potential of demand 
response, but could be considered instru-
mental for future studies that intend to pro-
vide such estimates. Indeed, without know-
ing how consumers can or could participate 
in demand response, it is difficult to make a 
robust estimation of the overall potential of 
active demand response.
Fourth, the time horizon of the report as-
sumes the readiness of the smart appliances 
and enabling infrastructure (‘the hardware’). 
We are aware that full take-off of active de-
mand response will only be possible on a 
large-scale after smart grid roll-out. Indeed, 
while demand response is already happen-
ing today, e.g. with electric boilers charging 
overnight with simple day/night time-of-use 
tariffs, participation in demand response 
could be strongly enhanced by smart grids 
(Faruqui et al., 2013). The hardware deploy-
ment proceeds with different speeds in Eu-
ropean Member States, though (EC, 2012d). 
Hence, for this report what matters is not a 
fixed time horizon, but when the hardware 
is in place. But this does not mean we rec-
ommend waiting on the hardware. On the 
contrary, we need to proactively prepare con-
sumers to engage in active demand response 
in order to ensure that consumers are ready 
and willing to use the hardware effectively as 
soon as it is in place. 
Fifth, the time horizon also assumes that 
regulated end-use tariffs have been abol-
ished, which is in line with the EU rules on 
the internal energy market (EC, 2012a). In 
the presence of regulated electricity prices, 
consumers do not have sufficient incentives 
to participate in demand response, since 
they are also not exposed to (and not even 
informed regarding) the real costs of electric-
http://think.eui.eu 5
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ity supply. As a result of the deformed signal 
sent through these regulated tariffs, consum-
ers are prevented from capturing the full 
benefit from demand response. This in turn 
can lead to a problem of adverse selection, 
where, e.g. consumers who have the most 
significant impact on the system peak – and 
thus a high potential for demand response 
– refrain from participating in demand re-
sponse as the regulated tariff for them entails 
a lower energy bill than would be the case if 
they were charged a tariff that better reflected 
the market price of energy.
Next, the analytical approach of this report is ex-
plained as follows: 
In order to stop the drift and really shift, we need 
to understand consumers’ behaviour from the per-
spective that they are truly active participants in the 
electricity system. Following such a perspective, we 
do not limit our report to the potential of financial 
incentives for demand response but explore a wider 
set of costs and benefits that consumers would be 
exposed to from the perspective of contracts and in-
termediaries. We undertake this analysis first in the 
context of the current electricity retail market design 
in Europe; then we investigate the limitations of the 
current market design and the risks it poses for a real 
shift to active demand response. This stage of the in-
vestigation leads to the identification of a major mar-
ket design challenge for the retail market. 
1.2.1 A focus on contracts
As previously stated, demand response can generate 
value by delivering various services to electricity sys-
tems. Even if, in principle, consumers can offer their 
demand response services without the intervention 
of an intermediary, residential and SME consumers 
face several barriers that may lead them to choose to 
participate in demand response through a contract 
signed with an intermediary. But instead of being a 
passive and uninformed recipient of this contract, ac-
tive consumers will be in a position to be aware of the 
multiple impacts of contracts on them and to be able 
to choose and even negotiate the contracts.
Contract terms can encompass a wide set of costs and 
benefits, as well as risks and responsibilities, which 
are, however, not necessarily made explicit to con-
sumers. Without understanding the full implication 
of the contract, a consumer can hardly be mobilised 
into an active consumer. Also, the counterparty of 
the contract – the intermediary – may have different 
incentives in designing the contracts and passing on 
benefits to the consumer. Therefore, to become active, 
consumers must have confidence in, and be assisted 
by intermediaries in their participation in demand 
response, instead of just being ‘captured’ by them as 
passive objects. 
Our report then takes this key role of contracts in the 
transition as a starting point towards active demand 
response and in shifting consumers towards being 
active participants in electricity markets. Through 
our analysis of the contract and the counterparty – 
the intermediaries, we systematically scrutinise the 
various factors affecting the consumer’s engagement. 
These factors culminate in the necessity of an ade-
quate range of contracts (Chapter 2) and a need for 
a diversity of intermediaries to offer these contracts 
(Chapter 3) in order to engage different categories of 
consumers. In each chapter, we put forward pragmat-
ic recommendations regarding necessary policy and 
regulatory measures to empower and engage con-
sumers to participate in active demand response. 
6Final Report – June 2013
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1.2.2 The Key Challenge: rethinking market 
design
Active demand response means – or should mean 
– that consumers/prosumers transcend the level of 
being merely better informed consumers and in fact 
become active participants in the electricity market: 
contributing to the reliable operation of the system 
by providing flexibility. The question arises whether 
the current retail market design, which assumes an 
inelastic and passive demand side, is suitable to allow 
consumers to make the transition to active ‘consum-
ership’.
We argue later in the report that a market design 
that accommodates this active role of consumers is 
the real-time market. In this real-time market both 
the supply side and the demand side are responsible 
for their positions in terms of generation and con-
sumption. Any player with an open position, in other 
words an imbalance, at the time of clearing the mar-
ket will just be ‘disconnected’ from the system. Such a 
market design is a way to largely dissocialise the bal-
ancing costs, and thus fully reward consumers for be-
ing active. Indeed, consumers will only become fully 
incentivised to be active market participants if they 
are exposed to both costs of imbalances and benefits 
of flexibility in the long term. Therefore, consumers 
must be empowered to play a new role and at the 
same time must not be overly protected if this would 
prevent them from taking up said role. 
Our report then revisits the contracts and interme-
diaries in the real-time market (Chapter 4), discuss-
ing the changes that are induced by the new market 
design.
1.3 Structure of the report
The report is organised as follows: in Chapter 2, we 
focus on the demand response contracts through 
which consumers are likely to participate in demand 
response, and in Chapter 3 we examine the role of de-
mand response intermediaries that consumers sign 
this contract with. The analyses of Chapters 2 and 
3 are carried out under the assumption that the pa-
rameters of the current retail market design remain 
essentially unchanged. In Chapter 4, we investigate 
whether a new retail market design can better accom-
modate the new active role assumed by consumers. 
In this respect, we revisit contracts and intermedi-
aries under the assumption of a real-time market. 
Furthermore, we scrutinise the role of the European 
Commission/EU institutions in implementing rec-
ommendations derived from our analysis. Finally, a 
glossary is included in order to clarify the terms used 
throughout the whole report.
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2. Necessity of an adequate range 
of contracts
It is to be expected that residential and SME con-
sumers, hereafter referred to as ‘consumers’, will par-
ticipate in demand response through contracts. This 
report distinguishes ‘demand response contracts’ 
from ‘electricity supply contracts’. An electricity sup-
ply contract arranges the provision of electric power 
to a consumer by an electricity supplier. A demand 
response contract, on the other hand, governs the 
relationship between the consumer, who adapts his 
consumption in response to a signal, and the coun-
terparty that provides this signal. Such distinction is 
necessary, first, to focus the analysis on demand re-
sponse only, regardless of whether it is offered sepa-
rately from or included in a supply contract. Second, 
in many countries, emerging market players are ef-
fectively proposing stand-alone demand response 
contracts to consumers, providing an alternative to 
the demand response contracts offered by incumbent 
suppliers. Hence, our analytical distinction does not 
necessarily imply that consumers participating in 
demand response have to manage two separate con-
tracts, one demand response contract and one supply 
contract2. They could be merged into one contract, 
obeying the principle of disaggregated billing that 
will be presented in Chapter 3. 
In this chapter, we demonstrate that it is necessary to 
have an adequate range of contracts in order to re-
flect, first, the variety of consumer load mixes, and 
second, the variety of consumer preferences. Indeed, 
without appropriate contracts that reflect different 
consumer categories according to what consumers 
are able to do, and what they prefer to do with regard 
2  By convention in this report, when ‘contract’ is men-
tioned we refer to a demand response contract. Whenever we re-
fer to an electricity supply contract, this will be done explicitly as 
‘supply contract’.
to their electricity consumption, consumers will not 
be engaged. Next, we discuss the challenges of select-
ing a contract from a range of contracts and provid-
ing recommendations to facilitate this process.
To this end, we discuss:
1.  The type of contracts that could be offered by 
the intermediaries: Section 2.1 Range of con-
tract types;
2.  Consumer categorisation according to the 
consumer load mix: Section 2.2 First reason: 
Variety of consumer load mix;
3.  Consumer categorisation according to con-
sumer preferences: Section 2.3 Second reason: 
Variety of consumer preferences; 
4.  The challenges for consumers to select a con-
tract from the range and how to facilitate con-
sumer choice: Section 2.4 Challenges and Rec-
ommendations for contract selection.
2.1 Range of contract types
Based on the existing literature3, experiences from 
industrial consumers’ demand response and practice 
in recent as well as on-going pilot projects, we dis-
tinguish five types of contracts that could be offered 
in the electricity market: (1) time of use (TOU) pric-
ing, (2) dynamic pricing, (3) fixed load capping, (4) dy-
namic load capping, and (5) direct load control. Every 
conceivable set of contract terms, i.e. the establish-
ment of price intervals, quantities, termination fees, 
start and end date, access to consumer data, rights to 
3 Contracts have been discussed, e.g. by Borenstein, 
2005; Brattle, 2011; DOE, 2006.
8Final Report – June 2013
http://think.eui.eu
remotely control appliances, etc., should then belong 
to either one contract type or a hybrid of these types.4 
We first systematically classify the different contract 
types with regard to the technical features, being 
form of signal and volatility of the signal; the latter 
encompasses both notice time and granularity. 
The form of the signal is either price or volume:
•	Price-based contracts: use a tariff for electric-
ity as the signal form to trigger a change in the 
consumption;
•	Volume-based contracts: constrain the load, i.e. 
the instant electric power consumption, to a 
contractually defined floor and/or cap;
For either of those contracts, the signal volatility can 
be low (static) or high (dynamic):
•	Static contracts: the signal is established with 
long notice for a number of predefined, rela-
tively extended intervals; volatility of the signal 
is low;
•	Dynamic contracts: the signal is established 
with short notice and for shorter intervals that 
better reflect wholesale market trading inter-
vals; volatility of the signal is high.
Next, we discuss for each contract type the high-level 
terms imposed on customers. These terms are not lim-
ited to the financial compensation that can be expected 
for such a contract, but they also include price and vol-
ume risk, complexity and loss of autonomy/privacy by 
the customer of the contract.5 
4  Hybrids of multiple contract types are conceivable, e.g. 
direct load control added to TOU pricing or TOU/ dynamic pric-
ing added to fixed load capping.
5  It is worth noticing that this selection of criteria does 
•	Price risk: this criterion reflects the uncertainty 
of the price for the consumer; in some con-
tracts, the consumer might end up with a high-
er bill than expected if he does not respond.
•	Volume risk: this criterion reflects the uncer-
tainty of the power that will be available to the 
consumer; in other words, with certain con-
tracts the consumer might have access to less 
power than is needed for all wanted end-use 
services, or he might have to consume more 
than expected if his current consumption does 
not meet his floor restriction.
•	Complexity: this criterion refers to the difficul-
ties consumers could have with understanding 
what is expected of them, e.g. having to deal 
with signal volatility, or learning the impact of 
different appliances on power consumption.
•	Autonomy/privacy loss: some contracts affect 
the degree of freedom in consuming power by 
limiting the total load or controlling the indi-
vidual appliances; the consumer is then also 
expected to reveal some personal information 
with regard to, e.g. what appliances he has and 
when he prefers to use them. Autonomy (being 
in control) and privacy (disclosure of personal 
information) are distinct issues that are, how-
ever, closely related. Such loss of privacy and 
autonomy requires a clear legal and regulatory 
framework to demarcate the responsibilities 
and rights of the consumer, the counterparty 
and other involved parties like the actors re-
sponsible for metering or data handling.
•	Financial compensation: the contracts include 
not aim at an exhaustive evaluation; instead, we intended to focus 
on criteria that could discern the impact of different contracts on 
consumers.
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a financial compensation, directly or indirectly, 
that should correspond to the imposed terms in 
the contract.
An overview of all these features can be found in Ta-
ble 1. In what follows, we evaluate each contract type 
according to these features. 
Static price-based contract: TOU pricing contract
•	Description: fixes tariffs for different intervals 
(e.g. 8.00h-22.00h day-tariff and 22.00h-8.00h 
night tariff), typically predefined upfront at the 
start of the contract; 
•	Passes on some price risk to the consumer, but 
includes no volume risk;
•	Simple to understand;
•	The consumer remains in total control over his 
consumption without having to compromise in 
terms of privacy; 
•	The financial compensation to be expected for 
this contract is limited and indirect through the 
savings made by consuming less in the more 
expensive intervals.
Dynamic price-based contract: Dynamic pricing 
contract 
•	Description: fixes hourly tariffs with day-
ahead or hour-ahead notice, typically reflecting 
wholesale price variations; 
•	Passes on much price risk, but has no volume 
risk;
•	More demanding in terms of complexity as the 
signal changes frequently, requiring mini-
mum levels of automation;
•	The consumer remains in total control of his 
consumption and the related personal infor-
mation; 
•	The consumer might expect a higher finan-
cial compensation, but due to the price risk 
the final compensation will depend on his 
performance to consume less when prices 
are high.
Static volume-based contract: Fixed load capping 
contract 
•	Description: fixes load caps and/or floors for 
different intervals (e.g. 8.00h-22.00h day-tar-
iff and 22.00h-8.00h night-tariff). Both the 
intervals and prices are predefined upfront at 
the start of the contract; 
•	Passes on a limited amount of volume risk, 
but does not include price risk;
•	Complexity is high because the consumer 
has to learn how to use his appliances to meet 
the contractual floors and caps;
•	The consumer loses some autonomy/privacy 
because of the load constraints: e.g. having 
to disclose when cap can be low or must be 
high; 
•	The financial compensation to be expected 
from this contract is limited.
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Dynamic volume-based contract: Dynamic load cap-
ping contract 
•	Description: fixes hourly load caps/floors with 
day-ahead or hour-ahead notice, possibly re-
flecting wholesale market conditions. But the 
prices are typically predefined. 
•	Passes on high volume risk, but no price risk;
•	High complexity of adapting load frequently, re-
quiring minimum levels of automation;
•	The consumer will have to reveal more informa-
tion about the timing of his consumption and 
is possibly restricted in what he can consume 
(e.g. the power cap could preclude simultane-
ous cooking and washing), implying a loss of 
autonomy/privacy; 
•	The consumer might expect a higher financial 
compensation.
We further distinguish a control-based contract in 
which the consumer cedes the control over specific 
appliances to the counterparty in the contract. The 
consumers are therefore not expected to react to any 
signals themselves. 
Control-based contract: Direct load control contract 
•	Description: a clearly identified part of the con-
sumer’s electricity consumption is effectively 
placed under the control of a third party. This 
third party then automatically and remotely 
shuts down, starts up or cycles electric appli-
ances at the consumer’s premises; direct load 
control contract is an incomplete contract that 
can be complemented by another contract type 
for the part of the load not subject to direct 
control;
•	There is no price and no volume risk for the 
consumer; 
•	The consumer loses all autonomy and will 
have to disclose personal information regard-
ing which appliances can be used when by the 
third-party for establishing the contract;
•	The financial compensation can be limited or 
high depending on the size of the load subject 
to third-party control.
We note that, for prosumers, contract provisions 
addressing the self-generation can be considered as 
overlapping a generation contract to the demand re-
sponse contract. Therefore, they are not included in 
our contract range.
These contract types have different functional re-
quirements in terms of metering and control: for in-
stance, smart meters should be capable of recording 
consumption on a configurable time basis (CEER, 
2011a), i.e. the intervals defined in the price-based 
and volume-based contracts, and they should be ca-
pable of remotely controlling the power to execute 
the load caps in volume-based contracts and allow 
the load control (possibly through a link to individual 
appliances) in control-based contracts. 
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2.2 First reason: Variety of consumer 
load mix
The first reason for an adequate range of contract lies 
in the fact that the potential of consumers to partici-
pate in demand response can be associated with their 
‘load mix’; and there are as many load mixes as there 
are consumers. The categorisation of consumers ac-
cording to their load mix would then help to distin-
guish consumers in terms of the flexibility of their 
load and, consequently, how responsive they can be 
to the different signals provided by the different types 
of contracts.
In this section, we first define consumer load mix. 
Second, we demonstrate how the appropriateness of 
a contract for a consumer depends on the match be-
tween his load mix and the technical features of the 
contracts. 
2.2.1 Consumer load mix
We categorise consumer load (appliances) into five 
load types (how appliances are used to provide end-
use services) that together make up the consumer 
load mix: (1) storable load, (2) shiftable load, (3) cur-
tailable load, (4) base load, and (5) self-generation 
(Figure 2).
Consumer load, i.e. the power consumption from 
the electricity grid, can first be categorised in storable 
load and non-storable load.
1. Storable load: the power consumption and the 
end-use service are decoupled by storage that 
can be in the form of (electrochemical) batter-
ies or thermal inertia.
Next, non-storable load can be further categorised in 
shiftable load and non-shiftable load.
2. Shiftable load: power consumption can be 
moved in time without affecting the end-use 
Table 1: Range of contract types: technical features and high-level terms imposed on customers
Contract 
type
Signal 
form
Signal  
volatility
Price risk Volume risk Complexity Autonomy/ 
Privacy loss
Financial  
compensation
Time of Use 
pricing
Price 
based
Static Low None Low None Limited
Dynamic 
pricing
Price 
based
Dynamic High None High None High potential
Fixed load 
capping
Volume 
based
Static None Low High Limited Limited
Dynamic 
load capping 
Volume 
based
Dynamic None High High Limited High potential
Direct load 
control
Control 
based
Predefined None None None High Limited/ High 
potential
Source: Own assessment
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service. Shiftable load often involves a non-
interruptible process like a laundry cycle and 
thus involves some planning. 
Non-shiftable load then is further categorised in cur-
tailable load and non-curtailable load.
3. Curtailable load: power consumption can-
not be shifted without affecting the end-use 
service, but the service can be interrupted in-
stantly.
The remaining non-curtailable load can be classified 
as base load.
4. Base load: the end-use service needs instant 
power and cannot be interrupted or shifted in 
time.
The load refers to net electric power consumption 
from the grid and is thus equal to the total power 
consumption corrected for self-generated power by 
the prosumer.
Figure 2. Load mix made up of different proportions of storable load, shiftable load,  curtailable load, base load and corrected for 
self-generation  
Source: own depiction
5. Self-generation: power generation at the 
premises of a consumer, reducing the net load. 
Dispatchable self-generation can be used as 
back-up power.
Together, the different proportions of these load types 
make up the consumer load mix; this load mix could 
then be qualified by its dominant load type: e.g. a 
‘curtailable load mix’ then has a dominant share of 
curtailable load. Consequently, consumers with a 
dominant share of base load can be seen as the least 
flexible, while consumers with a dominant share of 
storable load can be considered the most flexible.
Finally, it is important to note that the load mix of 
consumers is not static; it can change over time. In-
deed, taking into account that the load mix depends 
not only on the appliances but also on the lifestyle of 
the occupants of the house, there are several circum-
stances that can lead to a significant change of the 
consumer’s load mix; the acquisition of new appli-
ances (such as an electric vehicle) and the job switch-
ing by one of the occupants are examples of such cir-
cumstances.
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2.2.2 Appropriate contract for a load mix 
We now associate these load mixes to the static or dy-
namic nature of the demand response signal.
•	A curtailable load mix can interrupt load in-
stantly and is thus particularly able to respond 
to dynamic signals. Dynamic pricing or dy-
namic load capping can be appropriate con-
tracts for this consumer category.
•	A shiftable load mix needs some planning of 
load and thus benefits from static signals that 
are notified well in advance and are less volatile 
within day. TOU pricing or fixed load capping 
fit well for this consumer category.
•	Storable load allows using load so flexibly that 
it can respond to both static and dynamic con-
tracts. Furthermore, the decoupling of power 
consumption and end-use services makes this 
load suitable for a contract with third-party 
control. A direct load control contract, as well 
as all other contracts might then be appropri-
ate.
•	Finally, some consumers might have a base load 
mix, which has limited flexibility and is not 
suitable for participation in demand response. 
This consumer category might not find a con-
tract that is appropriate for their load mix.
So, to offer appropriate contracts for each consumer’s 
load mix, an adequate range of contracts should be 
present.
2.3 Second reason: Variety of con-
sumer preferences
Besides the technical ability, the engagement of a con-
sumer to participate in demand response depends on 
his individual ‘preferences’ regarding the costs and 
benefits that he associates with his participation. 
•	Costs refer to what the consumer perceives as 
something asked from him by the counterparty.
•	Benefits refer to what the consumer perceives as 
compensation in return for his participation.
Such costs and benefits are associated with consumer 
related criteria such as altruism and prosocial moti-
vation (Delmas et al., 2013), price risk, volume risk, 
complexity, loss of autonomy/privacy, and financial 
compensation. These criteria have been used to differ-
entiate the contract types (Table 1), except for altru-
ism and prosocial motivation, which are intrinsic to 
consumers and thus independent from all contracts. 
Consumers make an individual evaluation of these 
criteria. For instance, loss of autonomy can be a cost 
for one consumer whilst a benefit for another; and 
different consumers might attribute different value 
to the same criterion. So, depending on the individ-
ual consumer’s preferences, different contracts might 
then be appropriate; illustrated here for two possible 
consumers. 
•	A very well-educated consumer who is risk-
seeking in order to increase his financial com-
pensation, but is also concerned about his pri-
vacy.
 - Benefits: high potential for financial com-
pensation, high price risk, no loss of privacy;
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 - Costs: complexity and autonomy.
Dynamic pricing might be the most appro-
priate contract for consumers with these 
preferences.
•	A vulnerable consumer might have less income 
and be less educated and more willing to out-
source the handling of complex technology, 
even at a small cost.
 - Benefits: low complexity, high loss of au-
tonomy, low price risk;
 - Costs: volume uncertainty, limited finan-
cial compensation.
Direct load control, TOU pricing and fixed 
load capping might be appropriate contracts 
for this category of consumers.
Similarly to what has been discussed for the consum-
er load mix, also the preferences should not be con-
sidered stable over time. The way consumers valorise 
the different contract terms may change over time, 
e.g. due to information acquired from experiences 
with demand response. For instance, one could ex-
pect that the averseness for complexity may decrease 
over time, since consumers will gradually be better 
informed and more confident to actively participate 
on demand response.
2.4 Challenges and Recommenda-
tions for contract selection
It has been demonstrated that an adequate range of 
contract types, including the aforementioned five con-
tract types, is needed to reflect different load mixes and 
consumer preferences. However, consumers might still 
find it difficult to select the right contract type for them 
from this range, and furthermore, find the most appro-
priate contract terms for that contract type.
First, we identify the challenges in contract selection; sec-
ond, we discuss how to facilitate the selection process.
2.4.1 Challenges in contract selection
The contract selection process for consumers can be 
decomposed in four steps, including: (1) qualifying 
their load mix, (2) recognising their preferences, (3) 
selecting an appropriate contract type, and (4) find-
ing the best contract terms. Each of these steps can be 
a challenge for a consumer. 
1. Qualifying the load mix: consumers might not 
be aware of how their use of appliances affects 
their ability to participate in demand response 
(e.g. just considering all load as base load); 
they might also not be aware of the possibili-
ties of their load to be used more flexibly; or 
they might lack the skills to tap into the flex-
ibility potential (e.g. they do not know how to 
programme their washing machine).
2. Recognising consumer preferences: consum-
ers might not be aware of costs and benefits 
that are implicitly present in the contracts; they 
might not reveal their preferences; they might 
also lack the skills to properly evaluate costs 
and benefits.
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3. Selecting an appropriate contract type: a con-
sumer’s load mix might not be aligned with his 
preferences regarding the costs and benefits re-
lated to his participation in demand response 
(e.g. a consumer with a curtailable load mix 
– dynamic contracts, who prefers low uncer-
tainty and low complexity – static contracts). 
In the light of consumer rights in Europe, it 
should be clear that the consumer makes the 
final decision in this regard and he cannot be 
forced to enter a specific contract type (EC, 
2007b, 2010b).
4. Selecting the best contract terms: contract 
types are generic forms of contracts; the con-
sumer will still need to find an actual imple-
mentation of it. The lack of comparability in 
contract design might then prevent a consum-
er from identifying the best contract terms; the 
variety in contract terms might become too 
large to be able to choose.
2.4.2 Recommendations for contract selection
The following recommendations help to overcome 
the challenges for contract selection. First, we pre-
sent ‘consumer profiling’. A second recommendation 
consists in the introduction of ‘contract comparison 
tools’. The third recommendation is the monitor-
ing and ‘optimisation of the contract range’. Fourth, 
‘protection of personal information’ must be ensured 
regarding the information consumers reveal before, 
during and after selecting a contract. Fifth, for ‘vul-
nerable consumers’, consumer profiling and contract 
comparison tools might not be sufficient and addi-
tional assistance might be necessary. Finally, as a sixth 
recommendation, the ‘promotion and dissemination 
of pilot projects’ can help to develop the suggested 
tools for consumer empowerment. 
For a successful implementation of some of the rec-
ommendations, for instance ‘consumer profiling’ and 
‘contract comparison tools’, effective communica-
tion with consumers is prerequisite. In order to reach 
out to different consumers, various communication 
channels should be considered, including internet, 
information desks, telephone, paper, etc. Information 
should be disseminated on how and where the con-
sumer can access the tool should he not have internet 
at home: information sessions could, e.g. be organ-
ised at the city or district level by the local govern-
ment or a consumer association.
The presented tools do not only remedy specific is-
sues, but they contribute to the gradual building of 
consumers’ trust in demand response.
2.4.3 Consumer profiling
We discuss first what consumer profiling for demand 
response encompasses, then how it facilitates con-
sumers to select an appropriate contract. Finally, we 
also refer to important steps that may be necessary in 
the implementation of such methodology.
Consumer profiling is an instrument that helps a 
consumer in making explicit (1) his load mix, (2) 
his preferences and (3) how the contract types can 
be associated to load mix and preferences; thus deal-
ing with the first three aforementioned challenges in 
contract selection. Moreover, the unique features of 
consumers in terms of load mix and preferences are 
sufficient to evaluate the potential responsiveness of 
different consumers. Thus, the categorisation of con-
sumers according to these features may be considered 
as an accurate classification of consumers.
•	The load mix can be made explicit by including 
a survey on consumer load using the typology 
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of load types in Section 2.2.1; the survey should 
also provide general information on how appli-
ances can be used in different ways and where 
to get specific information on, e.g. automation.
•	Preferences can be made explicit by including 
criteria like uncertainty, complexity, autonomy/
privacy, financial compensation, etc. in a sur-
vey, which allows consumers to assess what 
they consider as costs and benefits of their par-
ticipation in demand response.
•	Contracts can be made explicit by including in-
formation on the technical features and terms 
they impose on consumers, e.g. by providing 
tabular information on the contract features as 
in Table 1. 
Consumer profiling then helps consumers (1) by 
facilitating contract selection, (2) by educating con-
sumers, and (3) by correcting/adjusting past choices.
•	Facilitating contract selection: profiling allows a 
consumer to find the appropriate contract for 
him that recognises his explicit load mix and 
his explicit preferences. 
•	Profiling itself educates consumers on load mix 
and preferences, and allows them to make de-
liberate choices on, e.g. investing in new appli-
ances or using appliances differently. 
•	Profiling can also help to correct or adjust past 
choices by pointing out the inappropriateness of 
a contract for a consumer in a particular situ-
ation, or by informing the consumer that an-
other contract is more appropriate if he changes 
his preferences or load mix over time. Chang-
ing contracts should be an easy and efficient 
customer-oriented process. 
For the development of consumer profiling, it is ad-
vised to scrutinise and learn from the example of in-
vestor profiling in the financial sector. Investor pro-
filing was installed to make investors more aware of 
their preferences regarding financial risk and to check 
in a restrictive way the appropriateness of certain 
investments for an investor’s risk profile (EC, 2004, 
2006b). Moreover, it is necessary to define which en-
tity (or entities) should be responsible for implement-
ing profiling. Since demand response is a market ac-
tivity, the intermediaries who propose the contracts 
would have an interest to provide a proper consumer 
profiling as it provides them accurate information for 
building their customer segmentation. However, to 
avoid excessive intrusion and facilitate market super-
vision, high level guidelines on the profiling method-
ology needs to be provided by national authorities. It 
is stressed that consumer profiling needs to be con-
ducted in full transparency with the consumer and 
can only be started with the consent of the consumer.
Contract comparison tools
First, we explain why we need a contract comparison 
tool in addition to consumer profiling; next we dis-
cuss the requirements for such a tool.
Consumer profiling helps a consumer to select an ap-
propriate contract type, but there could exist many 
different contract terms for this type (Box 1). A con-
tract comparison tool, then, directly addresses the 
aforementioned fourth challenge in contract selec-
tion by raising consumer awareness and facilitating 
comparison.
To fulfil its function, a contract comparison tool has 
to satisfy a number of requirements regarding: (1) 
quality of the provider, (2) quality of the methodol-
ogy, (3) transparency of the information, and (4) ex-
post evaluation.
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1. Quality of the provider: the provider of such a 
tool must be certified and highly trustworthy. 
Therefore, only an impartial and fully inde-
pendent actor can provide such a tool. Possible 
providers of a comparison tool are the regula-
tor or a newly created regulated actor, but there 
is also the possibility that a non-regulated en-
tity provides such services as long as activity 
itself is regulated and ensured to be fully inde-
pendent.
2. Quality of the methodology: the parameters 
that are compared and the method of com-
paring them must be clearly defined by the 
regulator to avoid dispute on interpretation of 
contract terms and to ensure the reliability of 
the tool. CEER’s Guidelines of Good Practice 
on Price Comparison Tools could be a starting 
point for the design of such a contract com-
parator (CEER, 2012a).
3. Transparency of the information: to ensure 
that all contracts include those contract terms 
that are used for contract comparison some 
harmonisation in contractual design might 
be justified (EC, 2010b; Ofgem, 2013). The 
establishment of minimum contract terms to 
be defined in each contract can help in that 
regard. These minimum terms could include 
price, volume, intervals, termination fees, no-
tice times, data access right, appliance control 
rights, etc. The comments by Consumer Focus 
on the quality of comparison sites could be 
useful for the identification of those param-
eters (Consumer Focus, 2013b).
4. Ex-post evaluation: the consumer must also be 
able to compare his electricity bill to the per-
formance he was expecting from his contract; 
allowing him to switch contracts if necessary. 
Thus, electricity bills require also transparent 
information on demand response participa-
tion (EC, 2006a, 2010b). Furthermore, con-
sumers should have access to their cost and 
consumption data with a frequency that is to 
be agreed upon between the consumer and the 
intermediary, especially if billing is only an-
nual.
Optimising the range of contracts
One standard contract will not allow all consumers to 
participate in demand response, whereas having too 
many contracts, might make it impossible to com-
pare and choose the best contract, even with tools to 
assist in contract selection. Thus, an adequate range 
of contracts involves a trade-off between having the 
market offering unlimited tailored contracts adapted 
to individual needs (one extreme) and having only 
one standard contract for all consumers (another ex-
treme); illustrated in Box 1. The national regulatory 
authorities could play a role in optimising the range 
of contracts for consumers’ interest (Ofgem, 2012). 
Some harmonisation of contract design is neces-
sary to allow the regulators to efficiently monitor the 
range of existing contracts before trying to reduce or 
increase the range. 
Therefore, the national regulatory authority could 
impose a notification requirement for every contract 
that is going to be offered on the market. This noti-
fication should include the signal type and volatility 
(see Table 1) allowing the regulator to connect the 
new contract to one of the contract types. Such har-
monisation can also help to directly reduce transac-
tion costs for consumers, e.g. by reducing complexity 
and facilitating comparison, thus lowering searching 
costs.
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Protection of personal information
To participate in demand response, the consumer is re-
quired to reveal personal information: first, to facilitate 
the contract selection process (revealing load mix and 
preferences), and second, to comply with the contract 
terms with regard to the sharing of data and personal 
information. Furthermore, we have illustrated that 
volume-based and control-based contracts imply a 
loss of privacy to different degrees: limited for the load 
capping contracts and high for direct load control con-
tracts.
The consumer must be confident that personal infor-
mation and data will only be used for clearly consent-
ed purposes. Adequate data protection rules should 
therefore be implemented to overcome challenges one 
to four (EC, 1995; Article 29 Data Protection Work-
ing Party, 2013).The starting principle must be that 
the consumer is in control: any request for access to 
information should be explicit about exactly what in-
formation is wanted and with which frequency, and 
the requested data must only become available to the 
requesting entity after the explicit consent by the con-
sumer (CEER, 2011b).
Protection of vulnerable consumers
In the light of the on-going work in the Citizen’s Ener-
gy Forum’s Vulnerable Consumer Working Group and 
of the development of an energy policy for consum-
ers, we can observe here that additional assistance and 
protective measures for vulnerable consumers are jus-
tified; in fact, a basis already exists in the framework of 
the internal market for electricity (EC, 2009c, 2010a): 
•	E.g. a definition of vulnerable consumers should 
be established;
•	E.g. a default contract to participate in demand 
response should be established; 
•	E.g. special measures to inform and educate vul-
nerable consumers should be established, for 
instance, in association with local social services 
centres.
Other measures could also be considered at Member 
State level, such as protecting vulnerable customers 
through social welfare systems.
Vulnerable consumers in the context of demand re-
sponse could be (CER, 2011; Consumer Focus, 2013a), 
but are not limited to: 
•	Low income consumers: these consumers have 
fewer loads to respond, reducing their abilities to 
participate in demand response and they might 
end up without any contract; 
•	Poorly educated consumers: these consumers 
might not understand the additional complex-
ity and uncertainty that they are expected to deal 
with as active consumers; they might not under-
stand the consumer profiling process and the 
contract comparison tool and still make wrong 
contract selections;
•	Consumers with load mix limitations: these 
consumers might be willing to participate in 
demand response but their personal situation 
restricts how they can use their load and they 
might end up without any contract, e.g. a con-
sumer with health problems might not be able to 
lower heating during peak hours.
From the examples provided above, one can foresee 
that the group of vulnerable consumers is not static. As 
mentioned before, circumstances regarding consum-
ers’ ability and willingness to participate in demand 
response can change and so it is also expected that the 
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circumstances that make them vulnerable may also 
change over time.
Promotion and dissemination of pilot projects
The contract selection represents a new challenge for 
consumers as well as for policy makers, intermediar-
ies, etc. Therefore, the development of the contracts 
as well as of the supporting contract selection tools 
will be a learning process for all stakeholders. The 
pilot projects on demand response, which currently 
aim at testing the acceptability of the new technology 
and related commercial arrangements with consum-
ers, could be of great added value to this process.
Nowadays, there is already a significant number of pi-
lot studies on demand response, some still on-going 
(ADDRESS, 2010; Stromback et al., 2011; Frontier 
Economics and Sustainability First, 2012). Despite 
the number of existing studies, the lessons learned 
concerning the consumer and the contracts from 
the existing set of studies are limited and insufficient 
to feed the debate on how to engage and empower 
consumers to participate in demand response. There 
remains a need to promote more contract-oriented 
pilot projects in the future in order to reach a con-
sensus on the understanding of a consumer’s engage-
ment. Additionally, consumers should also be made 
aware of the output of these studies to show them the 
potential benefits for society and for themselves.
It is also noted that, due to the local character of de-
mand response, pilot projects are mostly conducted 
in a decentralised way; and so is the dissemination 
of their output. The resulting lack of coordination 
between different projects, as well as the limited dis-
semination of results prevents different stakehold-
ers from sharing their experiences and improving 
the understanding of consumers’ engagement. Cur-
rently, reporting in pilot studies is mostly focused 
on the technological developments, while it should 
also be oriented to provide output to feed into the 
consumer-focused policy making (Lewis et al., 2012). 
Indeed, information relevant for the development of 
decision-making tools, such as consumer profiling 
and contract comparison tools, could be tested in pi-
lot projects and the results could be compared across 
the projects. Therefore, in order to extract the most 
value from these projects, there is a need to establish 
reporting guidelines so that the output can be easily 
disseminated and benchmarked.
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3. Need for an adequate range of 
intermediaries
Even if in principle consumers can offer their de-
mand response services without the intervention 
of an intermediary, domestic consumers and SMEs 
face certain barriers to directly participate in the en-
ergy markets such as market rules defining too high 
thresholds, and the transaction costs and risks that 
are too high if managed at the individual level. The 
first set of barriers could be removed by changing 
the market rules, while the second set of barriers still 
remains. That is why there is a need for intermediar-
ies to facilitate the residential and SME consumers to 
deliver demand response.
Intermediaries (also referred as ‘aggregators’ in other 
studies) are then entities that facilitate the demand re-
sponse transaction between consumers, who provide 
flexibility, and demand response procurers, who use 
flexibility to optimise their businesses, through con-
tracts as the ones discussed in the previous chapter 
(Figure 3). Very different entities can play the role of 
intermediary for demand response, and different en-
tities may have a different impact on consumers. Due 
to such differences, we argue in this chapter for the 
need of an adequate range of intermediaries (Sections 
3.2 and 3.3). Moreover, we also discuss the factors that 
could hinder the emergence of a variety of intermedi-
aries for demand response (Section 3.4) and provide 
recommendations on how to overcome these barriers 
(Section 3.5).
Box 1. Tailored versus standardised contract terms
To make participation in demand response attractive to consumers, contracts should match the load mix and the prefer-
ences of the consumer regarding costs and benefits. Hence, tailored contract terms seem a good way to build the required 
confidence with the consumer to sign a demand response contract that accommodates his individual preferences. 
Tailored contract also imply that there are many contract options for the consumers. This subsequently implies a risk that 
the number of possible contract terms to choose from would increase to uncontrollable levels. There is a trade-off between 
tailored contracts and some standardisation in the establishment of specific contract terms. An equilibrium must be found to 
ensure a minimum degree of freedom to tailor contract terms for consumers while limiting the maximum number of options 
that would create confusion or difficulty for consumers to choose, or for regulators to regulate. 
This idea could be translated into practice by making sure that options exist for each contract type or some hybrids, while 
limiting the variation in contract terms for a certain contract type. For instance, the British regulator, Ofgem, having recog-
nised the impact that offering numerous tariffs can have for consumers’ choice, is already planning to take a similar action 
within the retail market. Indeed, under the argument of difficult comparison of different tariffs and the increased lack of 
transparency, Ofgem plans to intervene in the market by limiting the electricity tariffs that can be offered to four (i.e. limiting 
both the typology and the variation of contract terms). The inclusion of basic information on the cheapest tariff and advice 
on how to select a tariff is another measure under discussion to empower consumers and reduce complexity (Ofgem, 2012). 
Figure 3. Interaction between consumers, intermediaries and procurers of demand response services
Source: own depiction
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3.1 Variety of intermediaries
Before discussing how different intermediaries may 
impact consumers, it is necessary to categorise the 
potential intermediaries for demand response. For 
analytical purposes, the large variety of entities that 
may play this role in the future is broken down into 
three representative intermediaries:
•	Supplier, which refers to the entities that, be-
sides being an intermediary for demand re-
sponse services, also provide supply services to 
the consumer. This then includes any company 
or legal person that sells electricity to final cus-
tomers, including integrated suppliers-DSOs.
•	Third-party, corresponding to a for-profit en-
tity having the provision of demand response 
services as his core business within the electric-
ity sector without being a procurer of demand 
response services. ESCOs, for instance, are a 
potential third-party intermediary.
•	Consumer cooperative, which refers to a non-
profit entity composed of an aggregation of 
consumers. These entities are typically small 
and localised, e.g. organised at the neighbour-
hood level or by consumer associations.
3.2 First reason: Intermediary prefer-
ences for the demand response contracts
An intermediary’s preferences towards certain de-
mand response contracts would be primarily related 
to the services that these contracts would enable, 
hereafter called demand response services. Since dif-
ferent demand response services may have different 
requirements in terms of consumer responsiveness, 
the interest of a certain intermediary in certain de-
mand response services can make him inclined to-
wards certain contracts.  
In this section, we first present the typology of de-
mand response services. Second, we discuss the inter-
est of each intermediary in different demand response 
services by looking at his incentive-based business 
model. Then, we discuss the matching between the 
technical features of each demand response service 
and the features of each demand response contract. 
The outcome of this analysis will then reveal the pos-
sible preferences of certain intermediaries over cer-
tain contracts.
3.2.1 Typology of demand response services
Demand response as a means of flexibility can have 
an impact both in the short term, for efficient and 
reliable operation of the total electricity system, and 
in the long term, for adequacy optimisation of this 
electricity system. Indeed, it can offer a diverse set of 
services to the electricity system. Within this section, 
we present a typology of demand response services, 
including a discussion on their specific technical re-
quirements and on their procurers.
We consider that demand response can offer five dif-
ferent types of services6 to the electricity system: 
1. Portfolio optimisation, which is used by mar-
ket players to meet their load obligations at 
minimum costs by arbitrating between gener-
ation and demand response on different time 
horizons. This service is procured by suppliers 
and other wholesale actors.
2. Structural congestion management, which 
6 The demand response services discussed in this report 
are a selection of possible services that have been discussed in 
the literature (e.g. DOE, 2006; Ofgem, 2010a; Frontier Econom-
ics, 2012); it is not meant to be an exhaustive list of flexibility 
services that could be offered now or in the future through active 
demand response.
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aims at solving congestion in the transmission 
system ‘that can be unambiguously defined; is 
predictable; is geographically stable over time; 
and is frequently reoccurring under common 
circumstances’ (ENTSO-E, 2012a). This ser-
vice is procured by TSOs and DSOs.
3. Occasional physical congestion management, 
which aims at solving physical congestion 
which is unpredictable and occasional, e.g. 
caused by distributed generation and renew-
able energy sources. This service is procured 
by TSOs and DSOs.
4. Balancing of the electricity system, which re-
fers to the ‘procurement of balancing reserves 
(capacity) and balancing energy by the TSO to 
perform balancing, meaning all actions and 
processes, on all timescales, through which 
TSOs ensure, in a continuous way, to maintain 
the system frequency within a predefined sta-
bility range’ (ENTSO-E, 2013). In other words, 
the TSO balances demand and supply by pro-
curing fast sources of flexibility. This service is 
procured by TSOs and in the future potentially 
also by DSOs.
5. Ancillary services, which refer to ‘a range of 
functions which TSOs contract so that they 
can guarantee system security. These include 
black start capability, frequency response, fast 
reserve, the provision of reactive power and 
various other services’ (ENTSO-E, 2012c). 
This service is procured by TSOs.
As these services help resolve different problems in 
the electricity system, they have different require-
ments in terms of reaction time, duration and firm-
ness, as summarised by Table 2.
•	Reaction time refers to how fast flexibility is re-
quired to respond to the activation signal in or-
der to provide the expected service. For certain 
flexibility services, such as wind power balanc-
ing, activation can only be decided at very short 
notice due to the unpredictability of wind; as a 
result, only the flexibility means with very short 
reaction time can fulfil this service.
•	Duration of response refers to whether flex-
ibility is required only to cover a short-lived 
perturbation of the system or whether it has to 
last over a longer time interval like for struc-
tural problems. It complements reaction time 
as it expresses the required persistency of the 
response after it has been called.
•	Firmness of response is required when a default 
on the flexibility offer would distort the reliabil-
ity of the electricity system. For instance, sys-
tem services that are close to real time must be 
firm to ensure a secured operation of the elec-
tricity system.
3.2.2 Interaction between demand response 
services and demand response contracts
We have discussed in the previous section that in or-
der to provide different services, demand response 
needs to fulfil different technical requirements. We 
have also discussed in Section 2.1 that different de-
mand response contracts have different technical 
features. Then, it is expected that there is a relation 
between the contract types and the demand response 
services. Indeed, the requirements of the demand re-
sponse services need to be adequately reflected in the 
contract features to ensure technical requirements are 
met by the consumer’s demand response. Table 3 of-
fers an overview of the plausible matching.
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Some general insights of matching the demand re-
sponse services to the contracts can be drawn from 
the Table 3: 
•	Demand response services requiring firm-
ness match with volume based contracts and 
in particular with direct load control contracts 
if, additionally, the response should be fast and 
available at very short notice. 
•	Demand response services which require less 
firmness could be met by price based contracts. 
•	The optimisation of structural electricity sys-
tem issues can be handled by static contracts 
that match with the need for a persistent sig-
nal over a longer interval; whereas services that 
need to be fast and variable are better embodied 
by dynamic contracts.
3.2.3 Business model: intermediary prefer-
ence towards demand response services
One might expect that any intermediary would al-
Table 2: Technical requirements of different demand response services in terms of reaction time, duration, and firmness
Service type Reaction time Duration Firmness
Structural congestion management Slow Long Low
Portfolio optimisation Slow Long or short Low
Occasional congestion management Fast Short High
Balancing services Fast Short High
Ancillary services Very fast Short Very high
Source: own assessment
Table 3: Matching between demand response services and demand response contracts*
Contract type
Structural congestion 
management
Portfolio 
optimisation
Occasional 
congestion 
management
Balancing 
services
Ancillary 
services
Time of Use (TOU) 
pricing
Fixed load 
capping
Dynamic 
pricing
Dynamic load 
capping
Direct load 
control
*Blank spots in the table indicate that requirements of demand response service are not sufficiently reflected in demand response contract features
Source: own assessment
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ways offer all demand response services in order to 
maximise the overall value of demand response. This 
expectation, however, may not be materialised be-
cause in reality, intermediaries can have divergent 
business objectives which make them attribute more 
or less value to certain services. Moreover, these ser-
vices can differ in terms of risk, which might be per-
ceived differently by different intermediaries. Hence, 
the business model of the intermediaries, i.e. making 
profit out of selected demand response services, can 
differ. This sub-section then discusses how the inter-
est in demand response services can differ for differ-
ent intermediaries by first analysing the intermedi-
ary’s core business and second their risk preferences.7
Core business
Out of the three considered entities, one has another 
core business in the electricity system: the supplier 
(selling energy), while the other two (third-party and 
consumer cooperatives) could establish their busi-
ness only with demand response. If the core business 
of the actor is not demand response intermediation, 
the incentives for being an intermediary could some-
how be affected by the incentive in their core busi-
ness. Here we discuss two cases:  
1. In the case that certain demand response ser-
vices can be for self-use, the intermediary might 
have a higher incentive to procure those services.
 - Supplier: might focus on self-optimisation 
of its portfolio of generation and demand; 
7  Note that this report does not aim to provide an ex-
haustive overview of intermediary incentives, but instead focuses 
on two incentive issues that show a potentially biased relationship 
between the demand response intermediary and certain demand 
response services. More information on intermediary incentives 
can be found in reports discussing the value of demand response 
(e.g. DOE, 2006; Ofgem, 2010a; Frontier Economics, 2012).
2. In the case that certain demand response ser-
vices are in conflict with the intermediary’s 
core business, he might have a preference for 
not procuring it. 
 - Supplier: core business is to sell energy, 
whereas demand response may be used to 
reduce the consumer’s load. Demand re-
sponse can thus be competing with supply-
ing more energy;
The two effects discussed above could explain the 
possible preferences of the supplier towards a limited 
number of demand response services.
Business risk preferences
The risk preference is another factor to explain why 
an intermediary could be inclined towards certain 
contracts. Intermediaries that are more risk averse 
might turn away from those demand response ser-
vices whose business risk is perceived as too large. 
These business risk preferences can be attributed to 
limited skills with concern to trading in different en-
ergy markets. Or the limited size of the demand re-
sponse business can turn away the intermediary from 
markets with large exposure due to volatility. For in-
stance, the balancing market is often smaller in size, 
less liquid and more volatile than the day-ahead spot 
market. In some electricity systems, procurement of 
ancillary services and congestion management tools 
might be non-market based and thus less transparent, 
increasing business risk for market players.
Risk averseness might potentially be higher for those 
intermediaries that have no vested business in the 
electricity system. Indeed, these actors are more likely 
to lack a robust core business that provides a financial 
cushion. Out of the considered actors in this report, 
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the commercial third party and the consumer coop-
erative fit this profile, but suppliers could also be less 
or more risk averse. 
The intermediary’s risk preferences can thus further 
narrow down his preferences towards demand re-
sponse contracts.
In conclusion, different intermediaries may have in-
centives to target specific demand response services 
and, consequently, to prefer specific types of demand 
response contracts. As seen in Chapter 2, an adequate 
range of contracts is necessary in order to better fit 
different consumers’ load mixes and preferences. 
The intermediaries’ preferences towards demand re-
sponse contracts could then affect consumers, by re-
ducing the range of contracts available.
Nonetheless, intermediaries’ differing preferences to-
wards demand response contracts are not necessar-
ily an issue for consumers. In fact, even if not all the 
contracts are offered by a single intermediary, they 
could still be available if different intermediaries co-
exist. Thus, a range of contracts matching different 
consumers’ preferences would still be available, but it 
would be offered by different intermediaries.
3.3 Second reason: Intermediary im-
pact on consumer surplus
Another reason why an adequate range of interme-
diaries is necessary lies in the fact that different in-
termediaries differently may affect consumers’ ben-
efits, i.e. the financial compensation that consumers 
receive from their participation in demand response. 
This financial compensation is related to the value of 
the flexibility services that the intermediaries procure 
from consumers via the contracts. Consumers’ sur-
plus discussed in this section refers to the value of 
the financial compensation that consumers receive by 
participating in demand response. 
The impact of intermediaries on consumers’ surplus 
can be twofold: first, the overall profit captured from 
demand response may differ depending on the entity 
playing the role of intermediary; and second, differ-
ent entities may split the profit with the consumer dif-
ferently. In what follows, we present an analysis of the 
twofold impact, then summarised by Table 4.
The overall profit
The overall surplus (the size of the cake) that can be 
captured by different types of intermediaries can be 
associated with (1) the openness of the intermedi-
ary towards the different services and (2) the costs of 
trade for this intermediary in providing different de-
mand response services.
•	The openness towards the provision of different 
demand response services can be hindered by 
the misaligned incentives with the core busi-
ness of each entity and by his risk-averseness. 
Within the previous section, we have already 
assessed this issue by looking at the prefer-
ences towards the provision of certain services. 
Indeed, if the intermediary does not have the 
incentives to provide all demand response ser-
vices, the maximisation of the benefit extract-
ed from demand response might be impeded.
However, it is also shown in the last section 
that it is not clear which intermediary would 
be able to capture the most value from demand 
response, since none of the entities would be 
fully open towards all the services that can be 
provided through demand response.
•	The costs of trade refer to the costs different en-
tities need to bear in order to play the role of 
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intermediary and this is strongly linked to both 
the skills of each entity and the economies of 
scale that can be achieved by the different enti-
ties. A supplier should have the necessary skills 
and, consequently, have a low cost of trade 
compared to a third-party and a consumer co-
operative. It seems more difficult for the third-
party to achieve high economies of scale due 
to higher costs to acquire customers, which is 
a typical problem for the new market players. 
However, commercial third-parties may have 
other businesses that, even if not energy related, 
already have a customer base which may reduce 
the costs related to customer acquisition. The 
consumer cooperative might be the model with 
the highest costs of trade, not only because the 
consumer cooperatives are usually extremely 
local (e.g. neighbourhood level), but also be-
cause they are commonly formed by customers 
who do not have specific training or experience 
in the sector. It is worth noticing that the econ-
omies of scale achieved by each of these entities 
could be very different; indeed, there are sup-
pliers with relatively low number of customers 
and there could be third-party intermediaries 
with relatively high number of customers.8
Profit sharing with consumers
Different entities share the captured surplus (the slice 
of the cake) with consumers differently; how they 
share can be associated with (3) their business ori-
entation and (4) the competitive pressure they are 
facing.
•	The business orientation refers to whether an 
8  For example, we could consider the case where a large 
telecommunications provider offered demand response services 
to its customers (see Section 3.4.1 for a more detailed analysis of 
this case).
entity is profit-based and, consequently, will-
ing to maximise its own profit or not. This has 
implications on the incentives for different enti-
ties to share the profit from demand response 
with consumers. Being profit-based, suppliers 
and third-parties have the main goal of max-
imising their own profit. This may imply that 
as intermediaries they would, on the one hand, 
try to increase the overall profit from demand 
response, but, on the other hand, would also 
reduce the customers’ share of the profit. None-
theless, it is worth noticing that this effect may 
be reduced by the presence of high competition 
pressure, as discussed in the following crite-
rion. The consumer cooperative is a non-profit 
entity, and so the whole profit is to be shared 
between the consumers. 
•	Finally, the sharing of profits with the con-
sumers is also related to the competitive pres-
sure each entity is faced with. Indeed, when an 
entity is profit-based, the higher the competi-
tion, and the fairer the distribution of profits 
with the consumers might be. When the com-
petition level is high, an entity is willing to 
reduce its own profit share in order to attract 
more customers; while in the absence of com-
petition, a customer’s choice is reduced and so 
there would be no need for the intermediary to 
provide more attractive incentives. Even if this 
issue could also apply to consumer coopera-
tive, it is mainly relevant when assessing how 
supplier and third-party would share the profit 
with consumers. Currently, it is recognised that 
in some countries, although in theory the retail 
market is liberalised, in practice there may still 
be only one supplier and a consequent lack of 
choice for consumers (EC, 2010a).
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The above analysis shows that different intermediar-
ies can indeed have a different impact on consumers’ 
benefit, while there is not a clear best. There seems to 
be a trade-off between the preference for specific de-
mand response services and the costs of trade, so that 
the intermediary that maximises the overall profit 
from demand response may vary, e.g. depending on 
the most profitable services. Moreover, we have also 
discussed the fact that the coexistence of different in-
termediaries will increase the competition level, lead-
ing to a fairer distribution of profits and, consequently, 
higher consumer benefit. It seems therefore necessary 
to ensure an adequate range of intermediaries and 
proper competition in order to safeguard consumers’ 
benefit from demand response participation.
3.4 What may hinder an adequate 
range of intermediaries
In the previous two sections, we have already dis-
cussed the importance of ensuring an adequate range 
of intermediaries. However, the existence of such a 
range of intermediaries may be inhibited by (1) mar-
ket power issues and (2) the existing market rules and 
regulations for the provision of different demand re-
sponse services. Within this section, we then explain 
how these conditions may limit the emergence of an 
adequate range of intermediaries.
3.4.1 Market power issues
The potential abuse of market power by a dominant 
intermediary may inhibit other intermediaries from 
participating in the demand response market, which 
may have negative implications for the consumers (as 
referred to in Sections 3.2 and 3.3). Indeed, this dom-
inance in the demand response market by a single en-
tity may not only lead to an absence of an adequate 
range of contracts and services provided, but it may 
also imply reduced incentives for the intermediary 
to fairly share the demand response benefits with the 
consumer.
In this section, we present three distinct situations 
in which the dominance9 in the demand response 
market by a single intermediary is likely to happen, 
namely: (1) high concentration in the supply market; 
(2) existence of integrated supplier-DSO; and (3) ex-
istence of an integrated business model for demand 
response and the deployment of smart appliances 
and/or enabling infrastructure. 
9  To avoid any misunderstanding, we only claim that the 
market distorting effects from abuse of a dominant position must 
be avoided or corrected.
Table 4: Possible impact of intermediaries on consumers due to their entity
Intermediary Openness to different 
services
Costs of trade Business orientation Competition pressure
Supplier Low: conflict with core 
business
Low Profit-based Limited
Third-party High Medium Profit-based Variable
Consumer coop-
erative
Medium: averse to 
high risk services 
High Non-profit Variable
Source: own assessment
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Dominant supplier
Market power in the supply market may be trans-
ferred to the demand response market, due to the es-
tablished large customer base and customers’ famili-
arity with the supplier. Indeed, while this horizontal 
integration of businesses would lower customer ac-
quisition costs for the supplier to enter the demand 
response market, it would simultaneously increase 
those costs for the new demand response interme-
diaries that would neither have an established cus-
tomer base, nor the confidence from the consumers. 
Moreover, since a supplier would provide bundling 
of services, it would be difficult for the consumer to 
distinguish between the costs associated to the sup-
ply of electricity and the benefits resulting from the 
participation in demand response. The potential am-
biguity regarding the actual benefits resulting from 
demand response participation, would make it diffi-
cult for consumers to evaluate the demand response 
offers of other intermediaries against the bundled one 
provided by the dominant supplier.
Hence, due to the already established contractual ar-
rangements, a dominant supplier for domestic con-
sumers and SMEs has a high probability of becoming 
the dominant intermediary in the market for demand 
response.
Integrated supplier-DSO
In certain regions, a DSO may integrate other busi-
nesses besides the operation of the distribution net-
work. Indeed, there are situations where the DSO is 
also a supplier, a producer, a trader, or a vertically in-
tegrated supplier/producer/trader. If we consider the 
latter, the supplier-DSO (being vertically integrated) 
would have more information about the regulated 
demand response services as well as about the load 
profile of consumers than any other intermediary. 
Moreover, similarly to a dominant supplier, he would 
also benefit from the established large customer base 
and customers’ familiarity and the provision of a bun-
dle of services (misleading the assessment of other in-
termediaries’ offers).
Thus, due to the already established contractual ar-
rangements and the advantage on data access, there 
is a high probability that an integrated supplier-DSO 
would become a dominant intermediary in the mar-
ket for demand response.
Dominance related to the deployment of smart ap-
pliances and/or enabling infrastructure
The deployment of smart appliances (or enabling in-
frastructure) may be financially supported by a de-
mand response intermediary, who is interested in 
enabling demand response to increase his interme-
diation business. However, as a prerequisite for the 
support provision, the intermediary would probably 
require the ownership and/or the right to control the 
appliances acquired (or the developed infrastruc-
ture). In either case, this deployment activity would 
provide an advantage to this intermediary in relation 
to the others, leading to the existence of a dominant 
intermediary. Indeed, within this situation, the appli-
ances/infrastructure deploying intermediary could 
have privileged access to consumer information; and 
in some cases, it could even impede the data access 
for other intermediaries. Moreover, this may also lead 
to a lock-in effect, since the intermediary investing in 
the appliances/infrastructure may impede (or make 
difficult) the switching of intermediary by consum-
ers. Indeed, when investing in appliances/infrastruc-
ture, the intermediary would either claim the owner-
ship of the acquired goods or at least require a long 
term contract in order to ensure the payback of his 
investment.
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Accordingly, an intermediary that would support the 
deployment of smart appliances and/or enabling in-
frastructure would likely have a dominant position in 
the demand response market, mostly due to the un-
even access to data compared to other intermediaries 
and the lock-in effect.
Concluding, we can say that this dominance in the 
demand response market by a single entity may 
emerge mainly due to four main factors:
•	The familiarity of existing entities, with whom 
consumers already have a contractual arrange-
ment, provide an advantage to entities who 
have other business in the power sector;
•	The bundling of services and the respective 
billing may make it difficult for consumers to 
compare the offers made by different interme-
diaries;
•	The preferential or discriminatory access to 
data, either due to the bundling of services or 
to the ownership/control of the enabling infra-
structure, hampers all intermediaries to have 
equal footing;
•	The lock-in of consumers to a certain interme-
diary may also be seen as a potential barrier to 
the emergence of a wide range of intermediar-
ies.
3.4.2 Market rules and regulation for the pro-
vision of demand response services
Flexibility services are already offered in different en-
ergy markets (e.g. spot market and balancing market) 
or procured through bilateral mechanisms (e.g. con-
gestion management services and ancillary services). 
However, existing market rules and regulation for 
flexibility services have been developed in a context 
without demand response and with a large focus on 
the generation flexibility. This may imply the under-
valuation of demand response resources compared 
to traditional flexibility resources in the existing 
energy markets. Moreover, the possible discrimina-
tion against demand response as compared to other 
flexibility sources to provide certain services may 
also lead indirectly to the discrimination of certain 
intermediaries. Indeed, as discussed in Section 3.2, 
different intermediaries may have different prefer-
ences regarding demand response services, and so the 
preclusion of providing the services they are inclined 
towards may prevent them from being an intermedi-
ary for all demand response services. 
In what follows, we present some examples of existing 
market rules and regulations that may limit the par-
ticipation of different intermediaries in the existing 
energy markets.
Market rules:
The markets where flexibility services are currently 
offered, namely the spot market and the balancing 
market, have strict rules and commitment require-
ments that need to be fulfilled by the actors willing 
to participate. Some of these requirements may im-
pede some of the demand response business models 
presented in this section to take place. For instance, 
in France, residential demand response is not allowed 
to participate in the spot market, even when several 
consumers are aggregated. Here, the main barriers 
seem to be related to the firmness and marginal im-
pact of demand response in the spot market, which 
are currently under the investigation of the French 
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regulator (CRE, 2007, 2010). Similarly, the balancing 
market may also not be effectively open to the resi-
dential demand response in some countries, due to 
the very strict requirements such as minimum bid-
ding volume, minimum bid duration and binding up 
and down bids (Ruester et al., 2012b).
Even though some of the existing market rules make 
the participation of demand response difficult for in-
termediaries, one should recall that these rules were 
designed to ensure the proper functioning of the dif-
ferent marketsat at a time when demand response 
was not yet considered a means of flexibility. Thus, 
it would be advisable to revisit the existing rules in 
a context where demand response is present, while 
assessing which rules are strictly necessary to ensure 
the proper functioning of the markets.
Regulation:
The procurement of congestion management ser-
vices and ancillary services is often not fully mar-
ket based, but managed through bilateral contracts, 
tenders with generators and even mandatory provi-
sions. Moreover, existing regulation does not always 
incentivise the procurers of these services (TSO and 
DSO) to consider demand response on equal foot-
ing to other flexibility sources. For instance, regula-
tory incentives for grid operators at the transmission 
and distribution level often focus on capital expenses 
(expansion of the grid). As congestion management 
through demand response implies an increase of op-
erational expenses instead of capital expenses, a DSO 
or TSO might prefer grid investments that can be 
added to the regulatory asset base. Such an element 
of traditional rate of return regulation would hinder 
the deployment of innovative solutions that are less 
capital intensive (Prüggler and Bremberger, 2011). If 
the regulatory framework in place does not provide 
a level playing field between demand response and 
other sources of flexibility, intermediaries’ business 
models that target regulated flexibility services might 
be seen as infeasible as the procurers of these particu-
lar services, i.e. DSO and TSO, might not show inter-
est in demand response. Hence, also for the services 
whose procurement is not market based, there is a 
need to adapt regulation in order to allow for demand 
response to compete with other flexibility sources, so 
that an adequate range of intermediaries may emerge.
Furthermore, the definition of network tariffs may 
also need to be revisited; network tariffs should pro-
vide correct signals to the market players regarding 
network constraints so that the demand response 
could be optimised to deliver the highest value for 
the overall electricity system. In the past, network 
congestion often has been positively correlated with 
high electricity prices as they both have been oc-
curring during the peak load periods. On such oc-
casions demand response could serve both purposes 
at the same time: reducing the local congestion and 
electricity generation costs. Nowadays, with more re-
newables in the generation mix, the electricity price 
could be low when power generation from renewable 
sources is abundantly available. In that case, demand 
response incentives are consistent with shifting load 
to periods of low price; causing, instead of mitigat-
ing, constraints in the local network. To resolve this 
challenging situation, it is important that the network 
tariff also send signals about the network constraints 
so that the network users, including the demand re-
sponse intermediaries, can assess all incentives related 
to the grid and the commodity. This way, the individ-
ual decisions of market players could work towards 
the overall interest of the power system. The network 
design is out of the scope of this report, though; it has 
been discussed in detail in CEER (2011a), Ruester et 
al. (2012a, 2013b) and Eurelectric (2013).
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3.5 Recommendations to achieve an 
adequate range of intermediaries
In the previous section we have identified which con-
ditions may hinder the emergence of an adequate 
range of intermediaries, including the presence of a 
dominant intermediary (who uses his market pow-
er to impede new entry), and the market rules and 
regulation that limit the role of intermediaries in pro-
viding different flexibility services through demand 
response. Thus, it is necessary, on the one hand, to 
avoid the development of dominant intermediaries, 
and on the other, the regulatory framework must also 
be corrected to ensure non-discrimination of demand 
response over other flexibility sources.
First, in order to allow for different intermediaries 
to emerge, there is a need to leverage the advantages 
of the incumbents and facilitate the market entry for 
new market players. To do so, the following actions 
could be considered:
1. The development of a licensing scheme specif-
ic for demand response intermediaries would 
help to increase the confidence of consumers 
in new entrants in the electricity sector. Such 
license then ensures that the entity fulfils the 
necessary conditions to provide this service, 
including conformation with minimum set of 
contract terms, switching process, etc. Cur-
rently, in some EU countries there is already a 
similar scheme for suppliers so that any actor 
willing to provide supply services must fulfil 
certain predefined conditions, which are rec-
ognised by the attribution of a license. The ex-
periences with such supplier licences should be 
further analysed with regard to the benefits for 
consumers, the compliance of suppliers with 
the license terms, the administration costs, etc.
2. The obligation to provide disaggregated bill-
ing information frequently enough so that in-
termediaries who provide a bundle of services 
may facilitate the comparison of offers from 
different intermediaries. Indeed, this would 
facilitate the use of comparison tools, as de-
scribed in Section 2.4.2, helping consumers 
to find the best contract for them and, conse-
quently, the best intermediary. We have seen 
in the previous section that the bundling of 
services, and respective billing, may make the 
assessment of different offers very difficult due 
to the aggregation of the different services’ 
costs into a single bill. The EU directive for 
end-use energy services (EC, 2006a) already 
requires informative billing to be provided to 
consumers; nonetheless, the mandate is mostly 
aimed at the recognition of actual energy costs 
by the consumers. Thus, it may be necessary 
to require that the financial compensation of 
consumers’ flexibility is also made explicit in 
the bills. Additionally, as discussed in Section 
2.4.2, the consumer should have the right to 
get information on his consumption and costs 
(commodity and network related costs) with a 
frequency – that can be higher than the bill-
ing frequency – and through a communication 
channel of his choice. 
3. Moreover, there is a need to ensure a non-
discriminatory access to data for the differ-
ent intermediaries. For instance, regulation 
should prohibit the information transfer from 
the regulated activity to the deregulated activ-
ity, so that an integrated supplier-DSO would 
not have an information advantage compared 
to other intermediaries. Any data sharing then 
requires prior consent by the consumer with 
the exception of metering data required for the 
regulated activities.
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4. Finally, in order to counteract the potential 
switching difficulties caused by the integra-
tion of demand response with smart appli-
ances (or enabling infrastructure) deployment, 
one could consider extending and promoting 
the existing independent dispute resolution 
mechanisms (ERGEG, 2010; CEER, 2012b) to 
reduce switching costs. In general, switching 
costs from one intermediary to another should 
be as low as possible to increase competition 
between intermediaries. Nevertheless, termi-
nation fees representing upfront investments 
made by the intermediaries could exist; in that 
case, they should be reasonable and clearly es-
tablished in the contract terms.
Regarding the existing market rules and regulation 
on the provision of flexibility services, change may 
be necessary to avoid discriminatory treatment of de-
mand over other flexibility resources. Nonetheless, it 
is important to stress that the call for a non-discrim-
inatory treatment for demand response does not im-
ply an artificial bias towards procurement of demand 
response as compared to other flexibility means. A 
level playing field does not guarantee that all demand 
response services be offered, but it should guarantee 
that the value of demand response can be monetised 
if it is a competitive solution.
•	In what refers to market rules, there is a need to 
revisit them in a context with demand response, 
to understand whether all the commitment re-
quirements are still valid in such context. For 
instance, there are already some on-going regu-
latory efforts to open the balancing market to 
demand response. In France, there is a dem-
onstration project to test the possibility of al-
lowing a third-party intermediary aggregating 
residential demand response to participate in 
the balancing market (Box 3). The European 
FP7 project Ecogrid EU presents another in-
novative way to allow participation of demand 
response in real-time markets: it tests a bid-less 
real-time market where residential consumers 
will be able to directly, or indirectly through an 
intermediary, respond to prices reflecting the 
real-time electricity system imbalance without 
any restriction to size (Ecogrid EU, 2011).
•	Moreover, regarding the procurement which is 
not market based (including congestion man-
agement and ancillary services), output-based 
regulation may be considered so that all flex-
ibility means can be equally considered. For 
instance, in the UK, Ofgem’s RIIO10-regulation 
rewards companies that innovate and run their 
networks efficiently by offering incentives fo-
cused on delivering ‘results’ without focusing 
on particular means to achieve those results 
(Ofgem, 2010b). Indeed, since 2010, networks 
have been regulated on a TOTEX basis, i.e. 
their revenue is based on a combination of capi-
tal and operation expenses. In Italy, the regu-
lator AEEG has started to adopt output-based 
regulation for certain services of DSOs11 (Lo 
Schiavo et al, 2013). The Orkney Islands (Box 
2) represents an interesting case in which inno-
vative regulation allowed the DSO to consider, 
on equal terms, all flexibility means (the ‘inno-
vation’) including curtailment of wind power in 
order to deal with congestion (its main target), 
avoiding building an expensive submarine ca-
ble to the Scottish mainland (the ‘conservative’ 
approach), while allowing further connections 
of distributed wind power (other benefits) to 
10  RIIO stands for Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + 
Outputs.
11  This output regulation applies to the investments for 
the purpose of service quality and distributed generation con-
nection; while incentives to reduce energy losses and to improve 
security of supply/congestion management are still input-based. 
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the local distribution grid. Such regulation al-
lows a level playing field to be established for 
demand response. It is noteworthy that such 
output-based regulation also implies significant 
operational challenges for the regulated actors. 
TSOs/DSOs not only need to verify the techni-
cal viability of new flexibility sources, but also 
need to ensure the coordination and communi-
cation with flexibility services providers so that 
these services are provided timely and with the 
anticipated quality. It could then be anticipated 
that the business model as well as the compe-
tences of the regulated actors would evolve 
with such regulation innovation (Ruester et al., 
2013b). 
4. A retail market design that 
accommodates active demand 
response
Throughout the previous two chapters of the report, 
the analysis has been undertaken under the current 
design of the retail electricity market which assumes 
low elasticity of the demand side (e.g. Lijesen, 2007; 
Allcott, 2011; Torriti, 2012). In this chapter, first it is 
explained why the current retail market design severe-
ly reduces the incentives for consumers to become ac-
tive. Then a new market design that accommodates 
active demand, the real-time market, is presented. 
Afterwards, we re-visit the analysis of contracts, in-
termediaries, as well as the recommendations drawn 
in the previous chapters in presence of the real-time 
market. We highlight that this new market design fits 
in a long term vision of the electricity market, where 
the tools introduced in Chapters 2 and 3 have reached 
maturity and consumers have gained confidence and 
experience with managing their demand.
Box 2. Orkney Islands – innovative regulation to regulate innovation
The Orkney Islands are located near the Scottish mainland and have an abundant presence of wind power turbines. But the full 
potential of wind resource is still not fully captured. The connection of more wind turbines, however, was impeded by congestion 
on the submarine cable connection to the mainland when local demand on the Islands was at its lowest level. To remove this 
constraint would require a high capital cost, which due to the insufficient number of consented renewable developments, is not 
yet justified (SSEPD, 2012). To allow further connection of wind power, an innovation of regulation was introduced to encourage 
innovative solutions that relieve the network bottleneck. 
Distribution grid innovations can be stimulated by three schemes in the UK: 1) the Innovation Funding Incentive (IFI) scheme that 
is a form of innovation input-based regulation, providing R&D funding for grid innovation by grid companies; 2) the Registered 
Power Zone (RPZ) scheme that is a form of innovation output-based regulation. 3) the Low Carbon Networks (LCN) Fund, which is 
introduced as part of the electricity distribution price control arrangements that run from 1 April 2010 to 31 March 2015.
The distribution network operator on Orkney Islands, SSEPD, has deployed several innovative solutions thanks to the aforemen-
tioned regulatory incentives. For instance, the Active Network Management (ANM) scheme has been established to connect ad-
ditional distributed generation through the Registered Power Zone (RPZ) scheme (Meeus and Saguan, 2011). Furthermore, SSEPD 
has launched the ‘Tier 1’ project through LCN fund, which aimed to procure congestion management services from third-party 
Energy Storage Providers (ESPs). To this aim, SSEPD ran a commercial tender process that was open to all potential ESPs, including 
those aggregating the demand side storage sources such as hot water thermal storage. The ESP was selected at the end of the 
tender process in 2012, and entered into a three-year contract with SSEPD. The energy storage system will work with the existing 
ANM scheme requesting absorption of excess renewable energy that would otherwise be constrained from the network. Valuable 
lessons have been gained in terms of design of the commercial incentives, risk assessment of service-based contracts, as well as 
the coordination between the DSO and flexibility service providers (SSEPD, 2012). 
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4.1 Weaknesses of current retail mar-
ket design 
Apart from the existence of regulated retail tariffs, 
the current retail market design starts from the as-
sumption of low elasticity of the demand side. This 
assumption consists of at least two facts: first, the sup-
ply contracts are by default offering unlimited elec-
tricity supply to consumers; second, the balancing re-
sponsibility is shared between suppliers and the TSO, 
the former socialising the balancing costs among his 
customers, while the latter socialises part of the bal-
ancing costs among all network users (Vandezande, 
2011). Such arrangements hinder the participation of 
consumers in active demand response, as explained 
in the following:
1. The balancing costs are not made explicit to con-
sumers.
First, consumers are not aware of the concept 
of balancing. Traditionally, given the absence of 
remotely readable meters or smart meters at the 
consumer level, suppliers use aggregated load 
profiles for their portfolio management. Indi-
vidual real time imbalance thus cannot be meas-
ured; hence, neither suppliers nor consumers are 
aware of individual imbalances. Moreover, sup-
pliers have the obligation to provide unlimited 
supply to residential consumers and SMEs who 
do not need to predict their power consumption 
and try to obey this prediction as large industrial 
consumers. 
Second, consumers are not aware of the financial 
consequences of imbalances. In the absence of 
individual imbalance accounts, suppliers spread 
out total balancing costs over all their custom-
ers so that each customer only pays a flat rate for 
each kWh consumed. Therefore, the balancing 
costs are socialised among a supplier’s customers.
Third, the balancing costs that are borne by the 
suppliers are not all the incurred costs. Under the 
current electricity market design, suppliers only 
have partial responsibility to procure the flex-
ibility sources to balance their portfolio, while 
in many countries TSO still procures the tertiary 
reserve on market players’ behalf. In most cases, 
only the activation costs of the tertiary reserve 
is allocated to those causing the imbalances, 
while the costs of reserved capacity are socialised 
among all network users. 
2. The benefits of providing flexibility are also not 
fully transferred to consumers.
First, consumers are deprived of the possibility of 
expressing their willingness to pay for guaranteed 
supply. The unlimited supply implies that all con-
sumers opt for the highest supply security. 
Second, consumers are deprived of the opportu-
nity of valuing their flexibility to reduce their own 
imbalances. Since there is no individual account 
of imbalances, the consequences of individual ac-
tions cannot be measured. Thus, consumers can-
not be compensated for reducing their imbalances. 
Third, the opportunity for active consumers to 
valorise their flexibility to mitigate others’ imbal-
ances may also be reduced. This is the case if the 
TSO does not procure demand response as one of 
the flexibility sources for balancing.
Therefore the current market design is not well-suited 
to activate consumers: neither can passive consum-
ers see the costs of their imbalances, nor can active 
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consumers be rewarded for their flexibility. Yet, the 
expected large-scale integration of distributed and 
intermittent power generation calls for a fully activat-
ed demand response to deal with the balancing of de-
mand and supply at a more local level than has been 
the case in the past (ETP SmartGrids, 2011). Moreo-
ver, the smart meter makes it possible to keep (more) 
individualised accounts of imbalances, thus allowing 
the allocation of balancing costs as well as the attribu-
tion of flexibility value to individual consumers.
In this context, it is thus necessary to rethink the 
market design with the anticipated active role of con-
sumers in mind. It is argued in this chapter that in 
the long term there is a need to move away from the 
current balancing market to a ‘real-time market’.
4.2 Real-time market: reveal willing-
ness to pay for electricity supply in real 
time
The real-time market implies that both the supply 
side and the demand side have the obligation to ex-
press their willingness to buy and sell electricity in 
real time. Such willingness could be expressed as one 
price/volume bid, or as a range of price/volume bids. 
It implies that residential consumers and SMEs will 
make deliberate choices about their electricity sup-
ply; they will not consume electricity for a price that 
they are not willing to pay. All market actors generate 
and consume what they have contracted. The system 
operator plays the role of market clearer and curtails 
generation or consumption if power generated/con-
sumed is more than what the actor has declared in 
the real-time market.
The real-time market accommodates active demand 
response, which is expressed by the willingness 
of consumers to pay for electricity in real time. It 
is worth noting that the real-time market does not 
imply that all consumers are exposed to full vol-
ume and price risk. Ahead of the real-time market, 
market players, including consumers, will have the 
possibility to hedge against the risk of the real-time 
market in the forward markets, which can close 30 
minutes, 15 minutes or even less minutes12 before the 
real-time clearing. In these forward markets, market 
players can continuously adjust their positions to cre-
ate a baseline as close to the expected real-time con-
sumption as possible. Only the deviation between 
this baseline and the realised consumption/genera-
tion is subject to the clearing of real-time market. As 
a result, demand response would become an effective 
tool for consumers, or their intermediary, to manage 
their consumption portfolio. 
Furthermore, the real-time market allows the task of 
system operators to procure reserves to be reduced as 
their role is changed into executing the contractual 
arrangement of market players. As a result, the so-
cialisation of these capacity reservation costs is sub-
stantially reduced, making the real-time market price 
a better reflection of balancing costs. 
4.3 Revisiting the contracts 
In the previous two chapters, the demand response 
contracts are discussed as distinct from the supply 
contract for analytical purposes, and for that they are 
and could be provided by actors other than supplier. 
This has already given rise to dispute between a sup-
12  There is still a need for a gate closure well ahead of 
the real-time because technical and organisational reasons (e.g. 
unexpected loss of a generation unit or a power line); the TSO 
is still responsible for the interval in between to keep the system 
balanced; the resources the TSO uses to manage the oscillations 
during such interval would mainly consist of primary and sec-
ondary reserves.
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plier and a third-party intermediary regarding the 
balancing responsibility, as illustrated by the case of 
Voltalis in France (Box 3). 
With the implementation of the real-time market de-
sign, this issue will disappear. Consumers will have 
three options to manage their electricity consumption:
1. Buying electricity in the real-time market ac-
cording to their willingness to pay,
2. Buying/selling forward directly to reduce the 
price and volume risk of buying in real-time 
market (hedging), and express their willing-
ness to pay or sell in real-time market for non-
hedged consumption,
3. Delegating the tasks of option (2) to an inter-
mediary.
In option (3), the intermediary’s task becomes almost 
the same as the one of a traditional supplier in a retail 
market, which is to buy/sell forward on behalf of the 
consumers and to manage the open positions, either 
short or long; except that consumers’ willingness to 
pay for guaranteed electricity supply is integrated in 
the contract. 
Hence, there would be no distinction between the 
demand response contract and supply contract un-
der the new market design; only electricity supply 
contracts would exist. The demand response is then 
incorporated in the supply contract, which defines al-
location of price and volume risk from the real-time 
market between the consumer and the intermediary. 
Therefore, the criteria we have used to characterise 
the demand response contract in Chapter 2 (see Ta-
ble 1) still apply to the supply contract under the new 
market design. 
Box 3. The residential load curtailment program in France
In France, there is currently a demand response program targeted at residential consumers, undertaken by Voltalis, a third-
party intermediary. 
The program ‘effacement diffus’ is a direct load control program for residential consumers, used by Voltalis to provide balancing 
services. Within this program, the intermediary offers a financial compensation to have the right to curtail load for a certain 
period of time. The sources of load curtailment are water boilers and electric heating systems (thermal inertia ensures the main-
tenance of comfort for consumers), and the interruption of load can be between 10 to 30 minutes of their full cycle (Voltalis, 
2013). 
In France, the supplier is obliged to provide residential consumers with unlimited electricity at a fixed price. Moreover, as the 
load curtailment is controlled by a distinct entity, the supplier is obliged not only to guarantee that electricity can be supplied 
(he has to buy forward) but also to pay for the imbalances, in case the customer is curtailed by the demand response intermedi-
ary. In the academic literature, it has been demonstrated that this situation may create an unbalance between consumer and 
supplier surplus as well as distortions in wholesale market price formation (Glachant and Perez, 2010; Hogan, 2009; Chao, 2010).
Concerned about this conflict between suppliers and a third-party demand response intermediary, the French National Regula-
tory Authority (CRE) has published in 2009 a proposal for the revision of the existing market rules, including the rules for the 
balancing mechanism, and advocating an obligation for the demand response intermediaries to compensate suppliers (CRE, 
2009). In the meantime, CRE proposals for new rules obliging third-party intermediaries to ask consent from all suppliers of 
the consumers in their demand response portfolio have been presented to the French Competition Authority, who has ruled 
against it, considering that the new rules could impede the participation of other intermediaries in the balancing market (Au-
torité de la Concurrence, 2012).
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4.4 Revisiting the intermediaries
With the new market design, the role of the interme-
diaries as discussed in Chapter 3 changes drastically. 
In the context of the real-time market, all intermedi-
aries act as suppliers (or better, managers of forward 
and real-time transactions) for consumers. There-
fore, the core business of the supplier is to optimise 
his portfolio of load (and possibly generation). If the 
demand does not respond or is not asked to respond, 
the supplier assumes the full risk in the real-time 
market, whilst if the demand responds, the supplier 
may use the flexibility acquired from the consumer to 
optimise his portfolio. As a result, there should be no 
conflict of interest for any intermediary to make the 
best use of demand response13, as compared to the in-
termediaries under the current retail market design, 
whose incentives for using demand response can be 
affected by their different core businesses (see Chap-
ter 3).
4.5 Revisiting the recommendations 
for contracts and intermediaries in the 
real-time market
In conclusion, the analysis of the contracts in Chap-
ter 2 still applies in the context of the real-time mar-
ket, but it applies to the supply contract, as there is 
no stand-alone demand response contract under the 
new market design. Consequently, choosing the right 
contract for consumers is even more important be-
cause the contract not only needs to match the load 
mix and the consumer preferences, but also needs to 
reflect consumers’ willingness to pay for guaranteed 
electricity supply. Therefore, the consumer profiling, 
13  Note that the previously distinct services of portfolio 
optimisation and balancing services have merged into a single 
service of portfolio management.
as recommended in Chapter 2, should also include 
consumers’ preferences for guaranteed supply. 
In contrast, the variety of intermediaries discussed in 
Chapter 3 is drastically reduced to a single type, the 
supplier, unbundled or integrated with a DSO, as all 
deregulated intermediaries act as suppliers. Nonethe-
less, the recommendations regarding the dominant 
intermediaries are still valid, albeit with a different 
purpose – instead of allowing for different intermedi-
aries to emerge, they allow the introduction of more 
suppliers in the retail market to foster competition. 
Moreover, it is necessary to guarantee that the three 
options to manage consumption referred to in Sec-
tion 4.3 are available for all consumers, i.e. consum-
ers can choose between managing their electricity 
consumption via an intermediary – option (3) – or 
by themselves – options (1) and (2). Although most 
consumers might choose option (3) due to reasons 
such as transaction costs, it is important to ensure 
that consumers who wish to manage their demand 
by themselves do have access to all markets. Thus, 
the recommendations regarding the revisit of market 
rules (as discussed in Chapter 3) are still valid. 
Finally, the recommendations regarding the regula-
tion on the procurement of flexibility services also 
apply. In the real-time market, the regulation should 
also be adapted to incentivise a market-based pro-
curement of congestion management services and a 
non-discriminatory treatment of demand side flex-
ibility compared to other flexibility sources.
5. The role of the EU
Throughout the report we have put forward several 
recommendations for empowering or protecting con-
sumers to participate in demand response and to be-
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come active market participants. We also have made 
recommendations with regard to market rules and 
regulation to allow demand response intermediaries 
to procure flexibility resources offered by consumers 
and to sell flexibility services in the different markets 
and procurement mechanisms. We consider these 
recommendations necessary to make a shift towards 
active demand response; they should therefore be 
implemented through appropriate policy and regula-
tion. As previously stated, our study is based on the 
assumption that smart meters are in place and retail 
prices are deregulated. Hence we do not make specific 
recommendations on this aspect. 
This chapter is dedicated to investigating the role of 
the EU in implementing these recommendations. To 
this aim, we first discuss on which grounds the EU 
involvement is necessary, then which actions should 
be implemented by the EU at different time horizons. 
5.1 The necessity of EU involvement
Although active demand response is a key instrument 
in realising the European-wide goal of a low carbon 
energy system, demand response is effectively or-
ganised in a decentralised and disaggregated manner 
with contractual relations being established between 
intermediaries and individual consumers. Given this 
decentralised and local character of demand response, 
national and even local authorities may be best placed 
to monitor and supervise the formation of these con-
tracts and to ensure the shift to active demand re-
sponse.
Nevertheless, the national and local initiatives might 
not be sufficient to realise such shift, as it implies a 
fundamental change from the traditional centralised 
and top-down market structure towards the decen-
tralised and bottom-up market structure. To make 
such change, Member States might adopt a different 
market design and implement it at different paces. 
This diversity would have an impact on the construc-
tion of the internal electricity market, which justifies 
EU involvement. 
Furthermore, given the expectations on the active role 
of consumers in the future energy systems, EU inter-
vention is justified on grounds of consumer interests, 
be it in coordination with local and national govern-
ments. In fact, this coordination is already taking 
place in the framework of the Third Package, which 
calls for measures for consumer protection, but leaves 
it to the individual Member States to decide how to 
organise consumer protection and to determine the 
powers and duties allocation among authorities. 
Third, EU involvement is also important for building 
confidence in markets and in active demand response. 
As previously mentioned, altruism and prosocial mo-
tivation are non-negligible reasons for consumers to 
participate in active demand response. The EU can 
also play a unique role in raising awareness of Euro-
pean citizens about the potential benefits of demand 
response for the society as a whole.
5.2 Recommendations
The actions which could be implemented by the EU in 
the short term include: 
1. Establishing guidance in the form of good prac-
tice codes or, if necessary, binding regulations 
for consumer empowerment and protection, 
i.e. to ensure that there are adequate mecha-
nisms in place to allow consumers to make an 
informed choice based on their load mix and 
preferences. These instruments should include 
an obligation to be placed on intermediaries to 
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provide a ‘consumer profiling’ (Chapter 2), as 
well as an obligation on national authorities to 
set up reliable, independent tools for ‘contract 
comparison’ (Chapter 2). 
2. Developing transparency rules for contracts 
and billing, consumption and cost information. 
Rules of conduct must ensure that consumers 
have easy access to disaggregated billing infor-
mation when demand response is bundled with 
other service offers (Chapter 3). 
3. Extending the existing dispute resolution 
mechanisms to active demand response and 
ensuring the independence of such mecha-
nisms. The existing mechanisms should be ex-
tended to demand response so that consumer 
interests are fully protected and also to guaran-
tee that consumers can switch without undue 
costs or time loss to new types of contracts with 
different intermediaries (Chapter 3).
4. Considering new consumer protection meas-
ures – to ensure adequate levels of data protec-
tion as well as to set up additional assistance for 
vulnerable consumers (Chapter 2).
5. Promoting pilot projects on contracts. Exist-
ing pilot studies are mainly focused on the tech-
nological issues of demand response, whereas 
our analysis shows that a technology push that 
disregards contracts would be probably ineffec-
tive, since it does not guarantee the engagement 
of consumers (Ruester et al., 2013a). Therefore, 
the EU needs to consider the re-orientation of 
the Strategic Energy Technology (SET) Plan, to 
further include ‘pilot contract projects’. 
6. Setting up a database of pilot studies to fa-
cilitate the dissemination and extrapolation of 
project results on an EU wide basis. Thus re-
porting guidelines also need to be developed. 
The database could be integrated in the existing 
Smart Grids Platform or a dedicated platform 
could be established.
The actions to be implemented gradually during the 
transition include: 
7. Facilitating market entry for new market play-
ers (Chapter 3). Consumer confidence in new 
entrants can be enhanced through the intro-
duction of a mandatory licensing or certifica-
tion system based on common criteria and the 
EU should ensure that these licences or certifi-
cates are recognised across the Union by all na-
tional regulators. Licensing conditions should 
be harmonised at the EU level (Chapter 3). 
8. Ensuring non-discriminatory access to all 
segments of electricity markets for all market 
players, including residential and SME con-
sumers (Chapter 3). Where markets are either 
already cross border or have the potential to 
have cross border impact, EU guidance and, in 
some cases, EU intervention is needed to ensure 
that these markets are contestable and open to 
all new entrants and new services. As far as the 
services that have to be procured locally with 
primary local impact are concerned, the EU 
should promote best practices in non-discrimi-
natory procurement of flexibility sources (such 
as output-based regulation), so that the value 
of demand response can be monetised if it is a 
competitive solution (Chapter 3).
9. Ensuring that national authorities monitor the 
non-discriminatory access to data relevant for 
demand response to prevent the transfer of in-
formation from the regulated activities to the 
40
Final Report – June 2013
http://think.eui.eu
deregulated activities in integrated suppliers-
DSOs (Chapter 3). 
In the long term, the EU plays an important role in 
the retail market design. 
10. The Third Package already provides a basis for 
integrated EU wide balancing mechanisms. In 
the longer term, the realisation of an integrat-
ed European wide real-time market could be 
the next logical step towards a smart European 
energy market (Chapter 4). This market can 
then be gradually opened to residential and 
SME consumers as active flexibility providers 
that contribute to the system reliability, while 
these consumers continue to have the option 
to use an intermediary if so preferred.
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Annex 1: Glossary
Active demand response
Changes in electric usage implemented directly or in-
directly by end-use customers/prosumers from their 
current/normal consumption/injection patterns in re-
sponse to certain signals.
Ancillary services
Range of functions which TSOs contract so that they 
can guarantee system security. These include black start 
capability, frequency response, fast reserve, the provi-
sion of reactive power and various other services.
ENTSO-E, 2012c
Balance responsible party 
A market participant or its chosen representative re-
sponsible for its deviations between generation, con-
sumption and commercial transactions within a given 
imbalance settlement period.
ENTSO-E, 2013
Balancing services
Procurement of balancing reserves (capacity) and bal-
ancing energy by the TSO to perform balancing, mean-
ing all actions and processes, on all timescales, through 
which TSOs ensure, in a continuous way, to maintain 
the system frequency within a predefined stability 
range. 
ENTSO-E, 2013
Base load
Load used to perform end-use services that need in-
stant power and cannot be interrupted or shifted in 
time.
Curtailable load
Power consumption that cannot be shifted without af-
fecting the end-use service, but the service can be inter-
rupted instantly.
Demand response contract
Contractual arrangement between a consumer and 
a demand response intermediary, regulating both the 
response required by the consumers as the signals and 
compensation provided by the intermediary.
Demand response intermediary (Aggregator)
Entity that establishes the link between the consumer 
and the demand response procurers, while baring part 
of the risks. The relationship between this entity and the 
consumer is governed by a demand response contract. 
Demand response license
Certification attributed to different actors, that ensures 
their ability to play the role of demand response inter-
mediary.
Demand response procurers
Power system actors who solicit flexibility services that 
can be provided by demand response. One actor may 
procure more than one service, and the same demand 
response service may be procured by different actors. 
Potential procurers are suppliers, DSOs, TSOs and oth-
er wholesale market players.
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Demand response services
Flexibility services necessary for the proper functioning 
of the power system that can be provided by demand re-
sponse, including: balancing services, ancillary services, 
congestion management and portfolio optimisation.
Direct load control
Predefined control based contract where a clearly iden-
tified part of the consumer’s electricity consumption 
is effectively placed under the control of a third party. 
This third party then automatically and remotely shuts 
downs, starts up or cycles electric appliances at the con-
sumer’s premises. 
Dynamic load capping
Dynamic volume based contract that fixes load caps 
and/or floors for short intervals with day-ahead or 
hour-ahead notice.
Dynamic pricing
Dynamic price based contract that fixes hourly tariffs 
for short intervals with day-ahead or hour-ahead no-
tice.
Electricity supply contract
Contractual arrangement between a consumer and a 
supplier, assigning the service of electricity supply of the 
first to the latter.
Enabling infrastructure
Power system infrastructure that is necessary to allow 
different actors to take full advantage of the smart grid 
roll-out. This includes smart meters, communication 
infrastructure, et cetera. 
Energy efficiency (improvement)
Means the ratio of output of performance, service, 
goods or energy, to input of energy.  ‘Energy efficiency 
improvement’ means an increase in energy efficiency as 
a result of technological, behavioural and/or economic 
changes.
EC, 2012b
Fixed load capping
Static volume based contract that fixes load caps and/
or floors for different intervals, typically predefined up-
front at the start of the contract.
Imbalance/Open position
Deviations between generation, consumption and com-
mercial transactions of a Balance Responsible Party 
within a given imbalance settlement period.
ENTSO-E, 2013
Load mix
Composition of the consumer’s load regarding the dif-
ferent load types. The load mix is characterised by the 
proportions of each load type on the overall load, being 
unique for each consumer.
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Occasional congestion (other congestion)
Occasional congestion is the physical congestion which 
is unpredictable. E.g. caused by random conditions for 
distributed generation and renewable energy sources.
Physical congestion
Physical congestion means any network situation, ei-
ther described in a Common Grid Model, or occurring 
in real time, where power flows has to be modified to 
keep the Transmission System within agreed security 
limits.
ENTSO-E, 2012a 
Portfolio optimisation
Arbitrage between generation and demand response 
used by all market players to meet their load obliga-
tions at minimum costs.
Prosumer
A consumer who also owns electricity generation, 
which is placed at the consumption site. The generation 
can be from renewable energy sources or not.
Real-time market
(Local) market for final settlement of open positions be-
tween actual generation and consumption of electricity, 
cleared by TSO (or DSO).
Self-generation
Power generation placed at the site of a consumer that re-
duces the net load that is taken from the electricity grid.
Shiftable load
Power consumption that can be moved in time with-
out affecting the end-use service. Shiftable load often 
involves a non-interruptible process like a laundry cycle 
and thus involves some planning.
Smart appliance
Appliance or device that is capable of modifying its 
operation in response to signals received from the 
electricity network or a communications system.
EA Technology, 2011
Smart meter
Advanced metering systems that support secure bidirec-
tional communication upstream and downstream and 
allows advanced information and management and 
control system for consumers and service providers.
EC, 2009b
Storable load
The power consumption that can be decoupled from the 
end-use service by storage that can be in the form of 
(electrochemical) batteries or thermal inertia.
Structural congestion
Congestion in the transmission system ‘that can be un-
ambiguously defined; is predictable; is geographically 
stable over time; and is frequently reoccurring under 
common circumstances’ 
ENTSO-E, 2012a
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Time of use pricing
Static price based contract that fixes different tariffs for 
different intervals, typically predefined upfront at the 
start of the contract.
Annex 2: Conclusions of Industrial 
Council Meeting (based on report 
version “V0”, February 2013)
Serge Galant 
Technofi 
Submission date: 1 March 2013
1. Background 
The present annex aims at shedding light on the first 
round of discussions about the first draft report on 
“Shift, not drift: Towards active demand response and 
beyond”. 
2. The issue
The issue raised by the report can be summarised as 
follows: “active demand response brings new ways of 
optimising the full electricity system, but consumer 
confusion should be avoided”.
3. What lacks in the first draft report: complete-
ness issues? 
The report must address the following items: 
Lessons to be learned
CEER has published a study on the conditions for the 
take-off of active demand response in 2011.
ENEL Distribuzione is experimenting with smart 
meters in Italy since 2007.
The French system operator is conducting an experi-
ment with 100 MW of aggregated active demand re-
sponse participating in the French balancing mecha-
nism.
Industry is already participating in demand response, 
what lessons can be drawn from their industrial ex-
perience.
The methodology
A review of active demand response per main areas 
of consumption: consumers, building, industry, etc. 
provides an estimate of the potential of active de-
mand response.
The impact of entry barriers for intermediaries and 
other regulatory barriers that hamper the non-dis-
criminatory treatment of demand response should be 
discussed.
Recommendations should be clear on how to imple-
ment them.
4. What is still fuzzy and must be clarified? 
Set the scene and the time frame of the recommenda-
tions
The scope, including the time horizon for the rec-
ommendations, needs to be clarified. This includes 
revisiting the narrow definition of active demand re-
sponse’. The report should clarify that active demand 
response is a means to further optimise the flexibility 
of the electricity system in terms of investments and 
operations.
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Methodology
It is advised to clarify where the potential value of ac-
tive demand response lies, how it can be monetised 
and how consumers and intermediaries can see and 
capture the benefits of active demand response.
5. What are the potential incoherencies in the first 
draft which must be addressed? 
The report aims at highlighting policy options to 
make the transition towards active demand response
The business models of demand response intermedi-
aries must lean on ‘win, win, and win’ principle: the 
intermediary wants to make a profit, the electricity 
system must be optimised and the consumer must see 
some benefits.
Annex 3: Comments from Project 
Advisers 
Wladyslaw Mielczarski,
Technical University of Lodz, Poland
Submission date: 17 June 2013
The report on Demand Response is very comprehen-
sive and presents the research of good quality. It cov-
ers in a complex way the economic and legal relations 
between energy users and various parties operating 
in electricity markets allowing for the demand re-
sponse of energy end-users.
My comments can be seen as the suggestions from the 
expert point of view indicating the elements which 
can be added to the report and how the structure of 
the report and its writing can be improved.
The report scope is good and very comprehensive. It 
does not relate to the problems already solved such 
as demand response of some electric devices such as 
electric water boilers which are usually covered by 
time of use tariffs. Such tariffs can be treated as some 
category of demand response.
What should be added to this report is the energy 
customer segmentation splitting energy customers is 
several groups which have different styles of life, and 
resulting energy use profiles, and which react in vari-
ous ways to incentive to response actively to varying 
prices of electric energy. For example such groups 
can include: a couple of pensioners, a family with 
children when one parent stays at home, a group of 
young workers or students sharing an apartment, etc. 
Also, Chapter 4 could be slightly improved by the ad-
dition of conclusions relating to the specific topics 
discussed in this chapter, when preserving the overall 
conclusions in the end of the report.
My suggestions to the framing of this report embrace:
•	 More	 clear	 statements	 of	 project	 objectives	
are advisable
•	 New	 findings/added	 value	 should	 be	 more	
highlighted
•	 Formulate	 recommendations	 and	 conclu-
sions in each chapter of the report and overall con-
clusions in the end of the report.
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Annex 4: Conclusions of Public 
Consultation (based on report 
version “V2”, May 2013)
Summary of the public consultation about the THINK 
# 11 report on “Shift, not drift: towards active demand 
response and beyond”.
1. The public consultation
The report which was put into public consultation 
aimed at using a consumer centered approach to pro-
pose policy recommendations that enable active de-
mand response (DR) in view of meeting consumer’s 
benefit. The link between the present day European 
policies and this work addresses also:
•	The search for an incremental flexibility of the 
electricity system,
•	The progressive arrival of prosumers14, thanks 
to renewables, who will be acting more “real 
time” than todays’ consumers to maximize the 
cumulated benefits of being a prosumer 
This in turn highlights why active demand response 
(DR) is of interest. 
Two questions are then raised:
What are the policy options which would help engag-
ing consumers to actively participate in DR in the 
EU27?
To what degree EU-based intervention / coordination 
/ harmonization might facilitate (accelerate) the de-
ployment of DR contracts
14  both producing and consuming electricity
2. Respondents
The responses of the following people or organisa-
tions have been analysed:
•	ANEC, The European Consumer Voice in 
Standardisation
•	ENDESA Group, an electric utility company in 
Spain. 
•	CEER, The Council of European Energy Regu-
lators
•	ESMIG, The European Smart Metering Indus-
try Group
•	EURELECTRIC, The Union of the Electricity 
Industry is the sector association which repre-
sents the common interests of the electricity in-
dustry at pan-European level, plus its affiliates 
and associates on several other continents.  
•	GEODE, an association founded in 1991 and 
made of European independent distribution 
companies of gas and electricity, representing 
more than 1200 companies in 15 countries, 
both private & public owned, which serve a 
population of 100 million people
•	ORGALIME, The European Engineering In-
dustries Association
•	Sustainability First, a registered charity in the 
UK with a focus on practical policy develop-
ment in the areas of sustainable energy, waste 
and water
http://think.eui.eu 53
Shift, Not Drift: Towards Active Demand Response and Beyond
Overall, the respondents have challenged the report 
on the following topics:
•	The scope of the report
•	The typology of the markets addressed in the 
report
•	The barriers which prevent such markets from 
expanding
•	The prerequisite to remove such barriers
•	The underlying vision which would support DR 
expansion 
•	The related role of the field players
•	The (over) protection of consumers 
•	The role of intermediaries in such contracts 
•	The policy recommendations
3. The scope of the report
The report needs a clear definition of what is includ-
ed and excluded from its scope: the text needs to ac-
knowledge explicitly that the exclusions are for the 
purpose of making the report ‘manageable’ and that 
in practice there are interactions which the report 
may not capture. 
For instance: 
•	Energy efficiency: many trial findings suggest 
that one of the effects of time-related pricing is 
that it may also incentivize permanent demand 
reduction at high-cost periods – as well as time-
shifting of load. 
•	Distribution level generation: on-site genera-
tors are in effect also consumers, since their 
onsite generation tends to displace imported 
electricity at high-cost times It thus becomes a 
customer load-shift or load-reduction response
It is then a pity that the scope of the report remains 
limited to residential and SME consumers, while the 
potential for DR is higher and more easily accessible 
by industrial consumers. Since DR is already largely 
applied in this market segment, the report could have 
drawn more lessons learned from these real life ap-
plications.
The definition of ‘active DR’ in the report includes 
only voluntary DR schemes. This might forget the 
economic / cost-efficiency case for mandated DR – 
for example mandated ToU tariffs. In practice, man-
dation may make sense in terms of driving the most 
cost-efficient outcome available from DR, since all 
customers would be incentivized to shift their load – 
including to some extent those with a high peak use. 
Such tariffs have been adopted in Italy and also, pro-
spectively, in Ireland, to help tackling major genera-
tion and / or transmission capacity constraints. For 
ToU tariffs which are always voluntary, there is a risk 
that existing behaviors are simply reinforced – rather 
than creating a universal incentive to time-shift. So, 
customers with a low peak-time use will choose a 
voluntary ToU tariff. But, rationally, customers with 
a high peak-time use would not opt for a voluntary 
ToU tariff if that would penalize their consumption 
pattern. This is not to advocate mandation – but sim-
ply to point out the dilemma of ‘voluntary’ versus 
‘mandation’. Not least, mandation entails some sig-
nificant issues around customer choice, retail com-
54
Final Report – June 2013
http://think.eui.eu
petition and political acceptability - which is why it 
will not be considered for adoption in some places 
but may be considered in others. Clearly, mandation 
requires both public acceptance / support and a very 
clear public understanding of the underlying eco-
nomic / cost-saving arguments for that approach.
The report should attempt to estimate the potential 
savings to be made by consumers from participa-
tion in demand response or the risks/costs of doing 
so. For the time being, it is impossible to know the 
percentage of consumers who would be interested 
in the different contracts. Pilot projects are not reli-
able enough about what can be expected, consider-
ing the participating test persons already are a priori 
interested in the new technologies. A representative 
recruitment and a sound methodology are needed 
to demonstrate the feasibility of demand response. 
In the case of smart meters, around 90-95% of con-
sumers opted out of pilot participation. In European 
countries where the electricity market liberalization 
has been slow, consumers should still be puzzled by 
demand response contracts.
The report lacks also assessing a realistic scope for 
consumers willing to shift demand e.g. how much 
demand could a consumer move from one time pe-
riod to another and for what period could demand 
be postponed, without adversely impacting consum-
ers. Contract conditions should thus allow a certain 
degree of flexibility in consuming electricity: con-
straints on choice (hours, use of infrastructures) can 
undermine individual freedom. Even when consum-
ers are aware of high imbalance costs, they often are 
hardly able to change their behavior.
4. The typology of the markets addressed in the re-
port
The report addresses the possible tools to be used in 
order to involve consumers in DR. It proposes match-
ing schemes for contracts-intermediaries-DR servic-
es that are new, thanks to an innovative way of think-
ing. Yet, it gives a too “disaggregated” vision, which 
does not capture the whole economic perspective of 
this new market / activity. 
DR is a low margin, high risk business. This will be a 
volume-based activity: thus managing flexibility re-
sources separately via intermediaries is highly ques-
tionable. Moreover it is unclear why the client needs 
to know how his particular DR contract works in re-
ality for his intermediary or the market: the technical 
complexity of the back office work will remain “out of 
sight” of the client.
The report should emphasize more the market op-
tions and the impacts on the electricity system, which 
are indeed very complex.
Traditional and real time markets
The concept of a real-time market as proposed in the 
report looks promising. Yet, the concept of the de-
mand side bearing a share of responsibility for the 
system appears risky15. Making end-customers re-
sponsible for their own load balancing in a real-time 
market is far removed from being customer oriented, 
since it may lead to obvious resource inefficiencies. 
Trading within liberalized markets is about letting 
market players optimize their actions according to 
15  For instance, customers are not responsible for the sus-
tainability of food supply unless we include campaigns to encour-
age customers to buy local products, which is the equivalent to 
encourage energy efficiency  
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costs and preferences. The report seems transferring 
risk to the party which has limited control over the 
management of that risk. A more useful alternative 
should be to discuss possible financial penalties if us-
age surpasses certain thresholds (a bit like monthly 
phone contracts). This issue would need much more 
study and discussions.
Electric system impacts
The increase in renewables in the grid and an increase 
in the level of demand response will require the de-
velopment of new models for system management. 
The daily and hourly profiles of electricity demand 
at system level differ with respect to the profiles of 
consumption and power flows in medium voltage 
distribution networks and of consumption and power 
flows in low voltage distribution networks. A flat de-
mand profile at system level allows for the reduction 
in the need for new generation capacity and system 
services. A flat power flow profile in distribution net-
works allows for a reduction in the need for distribu-
tion capacity and decreases the losses in distribution 
networks.
As a consequence, different consumer responses are 
best placed to flatten system demand or to flatten the 
power flow profiles in distribution networks. Further, 
power flow profiles vary across local distribution net-
works. Generally, the consumption patterns, the use 
of voltage levels and the characteristics of the gen-
eration set differ significantly across countries. These 
national conditions determine different values for the 
benefits at system level and at distribution level which 
can be achieved in each country through demand re-
sponse measures.
This theoretical scenario is suitable for areas where 
it is possible to have a flat demand profile. However, 
in a demand response environment with price signals 
from the wholesale market affecting the customers’ 
use of electricity, it is likely that a larger amount of 
energy will be used when the price is low. This can 
cause constraints in the local network
5. The barriers which prevent such markets from 
expanding
The report should more strongly underline some ba-
sic barriers that obstruct the development of demand 
response markets. It should also suggest possible 
measures to overcome these obstacles:
•	Price regulation at household level – still pre-
sent in 18 out of 27 EU member states – pre-
vents customers from realizing the value of 
(shifting) their consumption.
•	The electricity price elasticity is low. Given cur-
rent pricing structures, only a small part of the 
overall electricity bill can be influenced by DR 
measures.
•	Cost-reflective network pricing is necessary to 
ensure adequate revenues for DSOs in the new 
Distributed Energy Resource environment. It 
would also incentivize demand side participa-
tion.
6. The prerequisite to remove such barriers
The report should better underline the two prerequi-
sites to remove existing barriers:
•	Price signal, which is the key to getting con-
sumers involved in DR, is currently missing due 
to regulated tariffs in many European Member 
States 
56
Final Report – June 2013
http://think.eui.eu
•	Network tariffs must be adapted to the new DR 
environment in order to ensure that system 
revenues do not fall
A number of ways of managing tariffs do exist, among 
others:
•	A flat non-flexible network tariff, combined 
with a well-functioning demand response mar-
ket with price signals that reflect wholesale 
prices. This could result in the need for signifi-
cant investments in the network but increased 
transparency for the customer; 
•	Capacity-oriented network tariffs, semi-flex-
ible, a limited number of predictable tariffs 
combined with demand response signals from 
the wholesale market. This would result in the 
optimization of the local grid with a possibil-
ity to balance network constraints. This alter-
native means that the customer could have, as 
an example, a network-tariff based on kW. This 
alternative would mean that there are a couple 
of different grid tariffs but not too many as to 
make it extremely complex for the customer; 
•	Highly flexible and innovating pricing formu-
las for network tariffs combined with demand 
response with price signals from the wholesale 
market. This would result in optimizing of the 
local grid meaning a minimum of network con-
straints but a possible result is conflicting price 
signals from the wholesale market. This could 
increase complexity and confusion for the ac-
tive customer and for other actors on the com-
petitive market if not properly addressed.
It must be acknowledged that there is likely to be 
an increased diversity in tariffs, which may lead to 
a higher complexity. This poses new opportunities 
and threats for customers’ possibility to make price 
comparisons. The report acknowledges (2.4.1) that 
from a householder viewpoint, a future world of ac-
tive DR contracts is potentially a very complex world. 
In noting the sentiment in the report that consumers 
should be empowered and not necessarily over-pro-
tected, it is also important not to under-estimate the 
potential for future complexity as household DR en-
ergy markets develop. Ofgem’s Retail Market Review 
has recently high-lighted a need for ‘simpler, clearer, 
fairer’ approaches in GB retail markets. In future, 
in a DR world with multiple contracts and multiple 
offers (ToU, CPP, direct control, load management 
etc.), it will be increasingly hard for a customer to 
make good personal choices - and know how to make 
straightforward comparisons - notwithstanding the 
helpful suggestions in the report for customer profil-
ing, comparison tools, model contracts etc. Regula-
tory frameworks and regulatory principles and ap-
proaches for customer protection for household and 
small customers in a competitive DR world are likely 
to need significant attention from national regulators. 
For example, on effective comparison tools, avoiding 
contract or tariff lock-in, enabling continued cus-
tomer switching, all the data protection issues, iden-
tifying major gaps in current consumer protections 
which a digital smart tariff world might herald, un-
derstanding the impact of bundled services (energy, 
non-energy), and, not least, understanding whether 
current metrics (e.g. switching rates) for assessing the 
health of the retail market are still ‘fit for purpose’ in a 
smart energy world. In July 2013, Sustainability First 
will publish the eighth report from its GB Electricity 
Demand project ‘Electricity Demand and Household 
Consumer Issues’ – and that report discusses these 
questions of consumer safeguards in a smart energy 
world in some detail.
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7. The underlying vision which would support DR 
expansion 
The vision supported by regulators and which must 
be stressed in the report consists of four key areas:
•	Reliability – in the physical supply of energy, 
and in commercial systems and processes that 
provide continuous access and affect customer 
service levels, such as billing. It also means reli-
ability in the processes that allow problems and 
disputes to be resolved transparently, fairly and 
quickly.
•	Affordability – such that charges are clear and 
kept to fair and reasonable levels for all custom-
ers, reflecting value for money at a level con-
sistent with funding necessary investments to 
develop energy networks and to achieve energy 
policy targets (for example renewables), taking 
into account the real needs of customers. This 
can be secured through network regulation and 
other appropriate measures, if and when neces-
sary, and by providing customers with effective 
choice over truly competing offers and new, in-
novative services. Energy sector specific meas-
ures as well as wider social policies also have an 
important role to play, especially for the poorest 
and more vulnerable.
•	Simplicity – in how information is provided to 
customers, and especially residential consum-
ers, such that it is easy for them to understand 
their bill and better manage their energy con-
sumption, making the choices that are right for 
them. It also means simplicity and transpar-
ency in how key processes that affect customers 
operate. Many customers, and especially many 
residential consumers, want to be able to take 
quick and simple decisions in energy markets.
•	Protection & Empowerment – to ensure ac-
cess to energy supplies, and to guard against 
unfair commercial practices and unsatisfac-
tory outcomes, recognizing the diverse needs 
of customers, in particular the most vulnerable 
in society. For customers to be engaged, to take 
choices and to exercise their rights as energy 
customers, based on trust in, and knowledge 
of, how the energy sector operates. As respon-
sibilities shift and consumers are increasingly 
expected to become more active in energy mar-
kets (through developments such as demand 
response, smart metering, micro-generation or 
energy efficiency measures), the Vision recog-
nizes their right to choose by whom and how 
their energy is to be provided and charged. Al-
though this freedom could be framed by regu-
lation, offering meaningful choice for custom-
ers (including residential consumers) is a key 
way to ensure their full protection.
8. The related role of the field players
This report presents five different contact types “that 
could be offered in the electricity market”. A clarifica-
tion on the role of the DSO/metering operator in this 
respect should be brought. The DSO/metering opera-
tor is a neutral market facilitator, responsible for the 
basis of demand response. The DSO/metering opera-
tor enables smart metering systems capable of record-
ing consumption on a configurable time basis.
For metering, reference should be made to the GGP 
on Regulatory Aspects of Smart Metering for Elec-
tricity and Gas. Ref: E10-RMF-29-05.
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Demand Response aims at increasing the electricity 
system flexibility: it is also part of energy efficiency 
measures and can enable more effective integration of 
renewable generation into the energy system. Infor-
mation from Smart Meters in combination with mar-
ket information (such as energy prices) can enable 
the customer through their smart equipment to take 
actions that reduces pressure on the energy system at 
times when energy resources are in highest demand.
An important feature of the smart grid is the ability 
for electricity producers and customers to effectively 
change their electricity usage depending on the cur-
rent energy supply and demand situation. A producer 
could start a generation facility when the energy price 
reaches a certain level and the customer could choose 
to activate energy storage facilities such as hot water 
accumulators when the price is low. Energy prices 
are expected to be more volatile in the future due to 
greater renewable generation capacity which will less 
readily adapt its output to changes in demand.
The DSO, as the operator of the metering system, acts 
as an enabler of demand response functions for the 
market by providing the physical infrastructure for 
the market and also by providing actual consump-
tion information. In most Member States, the DSO is 
responsible for metering as an integrated part of the 
grid. The customers are always the owners of their 
data. It is important to realize that metering data 
belongs to the customers themselves. The DSO is re-
sponsible for ensuring that customers’ data is distrib-
uted only for regulated duties (e.g. billing). Any other 
data sharing must be approved by the customer.
The role of intermediaries is addressed below.
9. The (over)protection of consumers  
The report says that “customers must not be overly 
protected”. In fact, all consumers need to be ade-
quately protected. Empowerment and protection are 
not mutually exclusive. The description of a real-time 
market on page 10 argues that it is essential for con-
sumers to be exposed to the full risks (e.g. being dis-
connected) and benefits. The report fails to explore 
how consumers can be incentivized to participate in 
demand response without forfeiting the right to ad-
equate protection. Consumers need to be protected 
against both price and volume risks.
The report does refer to vulnerable consumers, but 
assumes that this is a fixed group of people. Consum-
ers move in and out of vulnerability as their circum-
stances change and their vulnerability is also depend-
ent on the situation. This needs to be reflected in the 
way that help is provided and protections developed.
Experience in other markets (e.g. financial services) 
suggests that consumers could be exposed to unscru-
pulous intermediaries, with consumers being misled 
or mis-sold complex products which are unsuitable 
for them and leave them exposed to large financial 
risks or penalties. The assumption on page 20 that 
consumers will be able to make an informed assess-
ment of their preferences for each of the criteria listed 
is highly questionable. What information will be giv-
en to consumers to enable them to make this assess-
ment? The regulatory measures proposed in the re-
port need to be strengthened, including more specific 
protection for consumers in vulnerable circumstanc-
es (a better word than vulnerable customers). There 
does not appear to be any proposal for consumer pro-
tection against intermediary comparison services.
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10. The role of intermediaries in DR contracts 
Active demand response contracts should not neces-
sarily be separated from electricity supply contracts, 
since the integration of supply and DR (including 
possible DSO tariff signals) could be a way to pro-
mote of broad acceptance of DR.
For household customers, it is more likely that the 
ESCO model prevails, meaning that demand response 
will just be a part of an energy services product, which 
could also include energy supply, micro-generation, 
information, remote control, etc. (depending on the 
‘package’ the customer chooses). This would then in-
validate the assertion that the supplier’s role necessar-
ily clashes with DR and energy efficiency. As the main 
interface with the customer, a supplier’s priority is to 
provide what customers really want to buy. Therefore 
many energy suppliers already offer energy efficiency 
products and services to meet the expectations of their 
customers. In some markets not only are customers 
interested in buying such products from their energy 
supplier, it has become a ‘must provide’ service.
It appears therefore too early to tell what customers 
want: consumers must be allowed to choose amongst 
market players, making demand response a commer-
cial activity 
As a consequence, regulated agents should not inter-
fere with these activities. While DSOs will play the 
role of neutral market facilitators, suppliers will offer 
products that are easy for the customer to understand 
and effectively manage any complexity in costs (e.g. 
variable grid tariffs). When DR and energy efficiency 
services are provided by DSOs or TSOs, these players 
would have a competitive advantage over third par-
ties offering the same services (captive market with 
margins guaranteed by regulation).
Moreover, the report should stress more strongly that 
intermediaries should not offer DR services to end us-
ers independently of the concerned balance responsi-
ble party (BRP), otherwise the latter will have to cope 
with unpredictable and hence un-forecasted changes 
in its portfolio and will bear the imbalance risks of 
actions initiated by other parties. For instance, if an 
intermediary concludes a DR contract with an enter-
prise that uses electricity for cooling (e.g. industrial 
deep freezers for vegetables) and shifts part of the 
load of this end user from hour A to hour B without 
informing the concerned supplier (=balancing re-
sponsible party), the nomination of the latter will be 
affected and he might face imbalance costs during the 
concerned hours due to this intervention of the in-
termediary. These costs would increase end-custom-
er prices: this can be avoided by putting in place the 
right framework governing industry processes.
Finally, the report refers to the possible risk where-
by a dominant position in the energy supply market 
might lead to a dominant position in the related DR 
market. This assumption might not be a valid argu-
ment (recommending that DR should not be offered 
by energy suppliers in general and by dominant play-
ers in particular). Moreover there is no direct link be-
tween the presence of a dominant supplier in a retail 
market and the market dynamics (competitiveness, 
quality of the services). Preventing (dominant) sup-
pliers from offering energy services could become 
counterproductive and hamper the development of 
DR. Furthermore it is not compliant with the free-
dom for any company to offer products and services 
within a liberalized market.
The recommendations to achieve an adequate range 
of intermediaries should be improved:
1. Licensing scheme: The draft report states that 
“Currently, there is already a similar scheme 
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for suppliers so that any actor willing to pro-
vide supply services must fulfill certain pre-
defined conditions, which are recognized by 
the attribution of a license”. The existence of 
licenses for suppliers varies across Member 
States. It is suggested  to add: “… in some EU 
countries there is already a similar scheme 
for suppliers …”
2. Disaggregated billing: the customer should 
have easy access to comprehensive data on 
his/her consumption and cost. However, the 
customer might not want to receive this in-
formation only through the bill, especially 
when frequency of billing is annual. The cus-
tomer must be able to choose from different 
communication channels and frequency of 
information. 
3. Non-discriminatory access to data: informa-
tion sharing is one key factor when consid-
ering customers´ reliability in the market. 
Sharing data is important, but it has to be 
done with the customer in the driver seat. 
The draft report should take the following 
into account regarding customer control 
of metering data: As already mentioned in 
chapter 2.4.2.4, it is always the customer that 
chooses in which way metering data shall be 
used and by whom, with the exception of me-
tering data required to fulfill regulated duties 
and within the national market model. The 
principle should be that the party request-
ing information shall state what informa-
tion is needed, with what frequency and will 
then obtain the customer’s approval for this. 
Full transparency on existing customer data 
should be the general principle. For instance, 
when a service provider is in charge of in-
formation on the customer’s voltage quality 
the customer should in this case be able to 
a) know that this data exists, and b) receive 
information on the explicit data. This infor-
mation could be subject to a reasonable fee.
4. Independent dispute resolution mechanisms 
(DRM): DRM bodies must work to ensure 
customers know this tool is available to assist 
them by communicating widely on the avail-
ability of DRM; Customers should contact the 
trader in the first instance when they have a 
complaint. DR should be used if the trader/
customer cannot resolve the complaint; the 
independence and integrity of the DRM body 
should be ensured, to promote customers’ 
trust in the process. The DRM body’s funding 
should be transparent; The branding of DRM 
bodies and any trader complaint handling and 
complaints services should be distinct and 
not create any confusion for customers; and 
where a trader is part of a vertically-integrated 
company, relevant authorities should monitor 
closely whether this affects customers’ rights 
and market competition market.
Last but not least, the role of consumer co-operatives 
is much less developed than those of other market 
players. These cooperatives are not well defined, al-
though they could play a vital role in the demand re-
sponse market.
11. The policy recommendations
Although the actual recommendations section sug-
gests that there should be no intervention unless the 
market does not function, other sections of the report 
seem to propose regulations for a market which has 
not yet had a chance to strongly develop. As a mat-
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ter of fact, following some of the suggestions of the 
report might prevent any demand response market 
from taking off.
Intermediaries accessing data on network congestion
It might be a too high level recommendation that 
could raise new issues in full contradictions with the 
future Network Code on Load Frequency Control 
and Reserves (still a draft) that describes in Article 50 
a method for distribution network congestion man-
agement, whereas demand response seems more suit-
able than the proposed open access to network con-
gestion data to all market players.
Need for large scale demonstrations
Incentives for R & D projects are needed and DSOs 
being responsible for the secure operation of the elec-
tricity system will need to lead the testing of new so-
lutions through. This is the way to evaluate and test 
the benefits of innovative intelligent technology, esti-
mate costs, learn about customer behavior, barriers to 
overcome and lay the foundation for possible further 
deployment.
DSOs are essential in the deployment of Smart Grids 
which will allow developing Demand Response: it is 
necessary that all DSOs, small, medium and large, 
are able to participate in these R & D projects. Larger 
and more numerous R & D funding programs than 
the currently exist are needed on a national and Eu-
ropean level. Such funds should be accessible to all 
network operators regardless of their size.
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CEER Response to DRAFT THINK REPORT "Shift, not drift:  
Towards active demand response and beyond" 
 
24 May 2013 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER)1 welcomes the draft THINK Report 
"Shift, not drift: Towards active demand response and beyond" in the interest of engaging 
consumers to participate in demand response. The report will be a useful addition to the 
current debate on demand response. CEER recognises the potentially significant value for 
consumers as well as for the industry from the efficient use of demand response and the 
importance of creating the right environment to unlock that potential. CEER has been and is 
continuing to explore this issue.  
 
It is right to consider whether current market arrangements are appropriate to facilitate the 
efficient use of demand response across different participants in the electricity system as it 
evolves. We agree that regulation needs to empower and protect consumers such that they 
can engage effectively with the market for demand response products and services. Such 
regulation should be guided by the principles set out in the CEER customer vision, presented 
below. 
 
CEER has during several years explored how to develop the European energy markets as to 
become attractive and beneficial for the consumers, where we have identified demand 
response as being one of the possible tools to engage them. The Climate and Energy 
Package2 have further accelerated this aim. To clarify and highlight consumer interests, 
CEER and BEUC, the European Consumers Organisation, developed a joint 2020 Vision for 
Europe’s Energy Customers3. It is a vision that puts customers first: a sector that engages 
with, and understands the diverse needs of customers, be they residential consumers, 
including the most vulnerable ones, or small businesses. A sector that anticipates future 
needs and takes steps to protect the interests of current and future customers. A sector that 
uses resources efficiently, ensures that their activities translate into social benefits, and 
offers all customers a fair and affordable deal for their services.  
 
The Vision consists of four key areas: 
 
• Reliability – in the physical supply of energy, and in commercial systems and 
processes that provide continuous access and affect customer service levels, such as 
                                               
1
 CEER is a not-for-profit association in which Europe's independent national regulators of electricity and gas voluntarily 
cooperate to protect customers’ interests and to facilitate the creation of a single, competitive, efficient and sustainable internal 
market for gas and electricity in Europe.   
2
 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm  
3
 This includes electricity, gas and district heating. http://www.energy-
regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS/CEER_PAPERS/Customers/Tab3/C12-SC-09-
07_3yrActionPlan_07Nov2012.pdf  
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billing. It also means reliability in the processes that allow problems and disputes to 
be resolved transparently, fairly and quickly.  
 
• Affordability – such that charges are clear and kept to fair and reasonable levels for 
all customers, reflecting value for money at a level consistent with funding necessary 
investments to develop energy networks and to achieve energy policy targets (for 
example renewables), taking into account the real needs of customers. This can be 
secured through network regulation and other appropriate measures, if and when 
necessary, and by providing customers with effective choice over truly competing 
offers and new, innovative services. Energy sector specific measures as well as wider 
social policies also have an important role to play, especially for the poorest and more 
vulnerable.  
 
• Simplicity – in how information is provided to customers, and especially residential 
consumers, such that it is easy for them to understand their bill and better manage 
their energy consumption, making the choices that are right for them. It also means 
simplicity and transparency in how key processes that affect customers operate. 
Many customers, and especially many residential consumers, want to be able to take 
quick and simple decisions in energy markets.  
 
• Protection & Empowerment – to ensure access to energy supplies, and to guard 
against unfair commercial practices and unsatisfactory outcomes, recognising the 
diverse needs of customers, in particular the most vulnerable in society. For 
customers to be engaged, to take choices and to exercise their rights as energy 
customers, based on trust in, and knowledge of, how the energy sector operates. As 
responsibilities shift and consumers are increasingly expected to become more active 
in energy markets (through developments such as demand response, smart 
metering, micro-generation or energy efficiency measures), the Vision recognises 
their right to choose by whom and how their energy is to be provided and charged. 
Although this freedom could be framed by regulation, offering meaningful choice for 
customers (including residential consumers) is a key way to ensure their full 
protection.  
 
These four key principles are all very important to take into account when developing 
demand response to ensure that consumers are put at the very centre of the energy market. 
Technical development will only succeed for the customer if it is based on the four key areas 
of the customer Vision.  
 
In relation to the draft THINK report “Shift not Drift”, CEER below presents general comments 
regarding simplicity in demand response, vulnerable customers, aspects on the grid tariff in 
relation to demand response, real-time markets and finally relevant on-going and future 
CEER work. In an Annex, we present comments and suggestions to specific chapters in the 
draft report. 
 
2. General comments  
2.1 Simplicity in demand response 
The draft report expects that residential and small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) 
consumers will participate in demand response through dedicated “demand response 
contracts” that are, in principle, distinct from “electricity supply contracts”. And that the 
electricity supply contract arranges the provision of electric power to a consumer by an 
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electricity supplier. A demand response contract, on the other hand, governs the relationship 
between the consumer, who adapts his consumption in response to a signal, and the 
counterparty that provides this signal. 
 
To begin with, it is important to identify that the customer in this smart world will face a more 
complex situation, also in the sense of more contracts. For many customers, it may mean a 
change from one contract to two or three (or more?): for the grid and for the supply, and for 
the demand response. As a result, only those customers who have the will and the 
knowledge face a more beneficial situation – the possibility to reduced costs for their 
electricity consumption as well as being able to contribute to a better environment. Another 
aspect is the fact that electricity demand is relatively inelastic, hence, there is a need for 
extensive automation and remote control of appliances. This necessitates a very clear (legal 
and regulatory) framework to make clear the responsibilities and rights of each party involved 
(including the customer). 
 
To prevent customers from experiencing the electricity market as too complex, risking non-
activity, CEER recognises4 that there are some key points in the market structure that need 
to be in place: 
• Customers’ understanding of information on the electricity market;  
• Customers’ offered easy ways of becoming aware (e.g. new contracts);  
• Customers’ trust in the market and thus wanting to participate; including customers’ 
clear identification of potential financial benefits or incentives in order to become 
active; 
• A non-conflicting grid tariff; and  
• The absence of price regulation (without prejudice to regulated prices set for 
vulnerable customers provided they do not distort the functioning of the market).  
 
Customer trust in the market can probably be regarded as the very basis for interest and 
activity. Trust can be built in various ways, but CEER emphasises that the service providers 
should aim to give customers appropriate information on offers, with the goal of creating 
customer awareness of how changes in lifestyle or occupancy can impact on household’s 
consumption patterns and therefore their final electricity bill.  
 
2.2 Vulnerable customers 
The EU Member States choose, for various reasons, to support vulnerable customers in 
different ways, some by explicitly taking care of them within energy regulation, others by 
incorporating them in the regulation of the social welfare systems. It is of utmost importance 
to recognise and respect that Member States can use different solutions, as long as the goal 
is reached: to protect vulnerable customers. CEER therefore suggests an amendment in 
chapter 2.4.2.5 in the draft report (please see Annex). 
 
The draft report states in the chapter on vulnerable customers that low educated consumers 
might not understand the additional complexity and uncertainty that they are expected to deal 
with as active consumers”. CEER recognises that trouble in understanding these issues does 
not only relate to what we might regard as vulnerable customers. Simplicity is needed for a 
majority of customers, be they vulnerable or not. The draft report could consider having a 
special chapter on the importance of the customer perspective in general. To succeed in 
                                               
4
 CEER Advice on the take-off of a demand response electricity market with smart meters (Ref: C11-RMF-36-03).  
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demand response schemes, reliability, affordability, simplicity, protection and empowerment 
are key. 
 
2.3 Grid tariff aspects in relation to demand response 
To avoid complicated situations when understanding the total energy cost, to facilitate 
comparison of offers and to enhance for intermediaries to develop offers to customers, it is 
important that grid tariffs comply with a demand response world.  
 
CEER recognises5 that the increase in renewables in the grid and an increase in the level of 
demand response will require the development of new models for system management. The 
daily and hourly profiles of electricity demand at system level differ with respect to the 
profiles of consumption and power flows in medium voltage distribution networks and of 
consumption and power flows in low voltage distribution networks. A flat demand profile at 
system level allows for the reduction in the need for new generation capacity and system 
services. A flat power flow profile in distribution networks allows for a reduction in the need 
for distribution capacity and decreases the losses in distribution networks.  
 
As a consequence, different consumer responses are best placed to flatten system demand 
or to flatten the power flow profiles in distribution networks. Further, power flow profiles vary 
across local distribution networks. Generally, the consumption patterns, the use of voltage 
levels and the characteristics of the generation set differ significantly across countries. These 
national conditions determine different values for the benefits at system level and at 
distribution level which can be achieved in each country through demand response 
measures.  
 
This theoretical scenario is suitable for areas where it is possible to have a flat demand 
profile. However, in a demand response environment with price signals from the wholesale 
market affecting the customers’ use of electricity, it is likely that a larger amount of energy 
will be used when the price is low. This can cause constraints in the local network. CEER 
sees a number of ways of managing this, among others to have: 
• a flat non-flexible network tariff, combined with a well-functioning demand response 
market with price signals that reflect wholesale prices. This could result in the need 
for significant investments in the network but increased transparency for the 
customer; or  
• capacity-oriented network tariffs, semi-flexible, a limited number of predictable tariffs 
combined with demand response signals from the wholesale market. This would 
result in optimisation of the local grid with a possibility to balance network constraints. 
This alternative means that the customer could have, as an example, a network-tariff 
based on kW. This alternative would mean that there are a couple of different grid 
tariffs but not too many as to make it extremely complex for the customer; or  
• highly flexible and innovating pricing formulas for network tariffs combined with 
demand response with price signals from the wholesale market. This would result in 
optimising of the local grid meaning a minimum of network constraints but a possible 
result is conflicting price signals from the wholesale market. This could increase 
complexity and confusion for the active customer and for other actors on the 
competitive market if not properly addressed.  
                                               
5
 CEER Advice on the take-off of a demand response electricity market with smart meters.  
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CEER recognises that each NRA has to consider this in relation to network tariff-regulation in 
order to facilitate a well-functioning demand response. However, it is very important to note 
that pricing, for example time-of-use pricing, is part of the decisions made in the competitive 
market and should reflect the access to - and need for as well as the cost-reflectiveness of - 
energy at any given time. For suppliers to be able to give customers offers that reflect actual 
consumption patterns, DSOs/metering operators have to enable smart metering systems 
capable of recording consumption on a configurable time basis.  
 
The DSOs’ role with regard to demand response should be restricted to the basic 
requirements necessary to facilitate demand response. This is a delicate balancing act 
between a possible variety of innovative network tariffs and customer confusion and 
increased complexity for NRAs as well as reduced transparency. We also see the risks of 
increased complexity in network tariffs in relation to suppliers and energy service companies, 
when they will develop offers reflecting actual consumption particularly in Member States 
with multiple DSOs. Last but not least, the customer has no power in negotiating network 
tariffs – it is important to minimise the extent of the areas in the electricity market where the 
customer has limited possibilities to act. We should also remind here the main mission of the 
network operators i.e. security and reliability of the network.  
 
CEER acknowledges that there is likely to be an increased diversity, which may lead to 
complexity, in the range of tariff offers. This poses new opportunities and risks for customers’ 
possibility to make price comparisons. 
 
2.4 Real time markets 
In relation to the real-time market proposals in the draft report, CEER would like to highlight 
the need for further investigation and the sorts of principles that any potential future market 
model would need to adhere to. 
 
The draft report notes that for demand response to develop there is likely to be a need for 
clearer price signals across the system - to encourage market participants to engage and 
enable them to benefit from demand response. The proposal to move towards a real-time 
market in which consumers participate alongside the supply side is one of a range of 
possible market models that have been identified. Further consideration needs to be given to 
whether this or other market models can best unlock the potential for demand response in a 
way that is consistent with the CEER-BEUC Customer Vision. This should include 
consideration of the consumers' ability to engage effectively in the market for demand 
response, as well as the appropriate roles and responsibilities of different participants, 
including TSOs, DSOs, suppliers, intermediaries and customers. 
 
It is also worthwhile noticing that in several countries the imbalance costs are already (partly) 
passed to different market players. The TSO is usually responsible for balancing the system 
following the current European rules and in future the network codes. The procurement of the 
TSO ensures an efficient allocation of resources, including failure reserve. For an end user, 
the effort of being responsible for his/her balance seems to exceed the advantages. 
Furthermore, conformity with the future network code balancing is mandatory.  
 
The concept of a real-time market has advantages but also obstacles which need to be 
addressed before taking a decision.  
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3. On-going and future work of CEER 
In relation to the THINK report, CEER would like to highlight on-going, future and published 
deliverables by CEER. 
 
The 2013 on-going customer work includes an analysis of the involvement of consumer 
organisations in the regulatory process; a review of how smart metering is progressing 
across Europe; and a review of current practices in terms of customers’ access to 
information on the cost and sources of their energy as well as energy efficiency schemes. 
Advice will be formulated on data management for better retail market functioning and on 
electricity green offers.  
 
In 2014 it is envisaged to investigate on Demand Response in Europe through a 
Benchmarking report. What are the existing electricity offers (Time of Use (ToU), dynamic 
and critical peak pricing) from suppliers? How do aggregators (and other similar actors) work 
and communicate with customers? Which are the regulatory barriers for these business 
models?  
 
Published CEER documents related to the THINK report: 
 
 A 2020 Vision for Europe’s energy customers 
 
Advice on the take-off of a demand response electricity market with smart meters, Ref. C11-
RMF-36-03, 1 December 2011 
 
CEER submission to European Commission Consultation on Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR) Ref. C11-RMC-46-03, 8 March 2011 
 
GGP on Regulatory Aspects of Smart Metering for Electricity and Gas, Ref. E10-RMF-29-05, 
February 2011 
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ANNEX 
 
Comments and suggestions to specific chapters in the draft THINK report “Shift not 
Drift” 
 
Chapter 2: Necessity of an adequate range of contracts 
 
General comment: CEER recognises the need for a range of contracts types, to customise 
the customers´ needs and to increase the competition in the market.  
 
      Chapter 2.1 Range of contract types 
 
This chapter presents five different contact types “that could be offered in the electricity 
market”. CEER suggests a clarification on the role of the DSO/metering operator in this 
respect. CEER regards the DSO/metering operator as a neutral market facilitator, 
responsible for the basis of demand response. The DSO/metering operator enables smart 
metering systems capable of recording consumption on a configurable time basis.6  
 
Chapter 2.4.2 Recommendations for contract selection 
 
We suggest adding the underscored word in the following sentence:                             
“Fourth, consumers must be able to rely on protection of personal information they reveal 
before, during and after selecting a contract.” 
 
Chapter 2.4.2.1 Consumer profiling 
 
Before concluding a contract, the service providers should aim to give customers appropriate 
information on offers, with the goal of creating customer awareness of how changes in 
lifestyle or occupancy can impact on household consumption patterns and therefore their 
final electricity bill. 7 Hence, what the draft report refers to as “customer profiling” is good, as 
long as it is conducted in full transparency with the customer (who is not always a “he”), and 
not started until there is a customer consent. We suggest that sentence be added. 
 
     Chapter 2.4.2.2 Contract comparison tools 
 
CEER welcomes the recognition of our Guidelines of Good Practice on Price Comparison 
Tools.  
 
Chapter 2.4.2.3 Optimising the range of contracts: model contracts 
 
The draft report states that “the regulator might have a role in this optimisation of the range of 
contracts …”. CEER agrees to this, while at the same time stressing that the decision to 
enter into this role must be made nationally. 
 
Chapter 2.4.2.4 Protection of personal information 
 
                                               
6
 CEER Advice on the take-off of a demand response electricity market with smart meters (Ref: C11-RMF-36-03) 
7
 CEER Advice on the take-off of a demand response electricity market with smart meters (Ref: C11-RMF-36-03).  
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As has already been said above, CEER recognises that information sharing is one key factor 
when considering customers´ trust in the market. Sharing data is important, but it has to be 
done from the customer perspective. CEER would strongly recommend that the draft report 
take the following into account regarding protection of personal information and customer 
control of metering data: 
 
It is always the customer that chooses in which way metering data shall be used and by 
whom, with the exception of metering data required to fulfil regulated duties and within the 
national market model. The principle should be that the party requesting information shall 
state what information is needed, with what frequency and will then obtain the customer’s 
approval for this. Full transparency on existing customer data should be the general principle. 
For instance, when a service provider is in charge of information on the customer’s voltage 
quality the customer should in this case be able to a) know that this data exists, and b) 
receive information on the explicit data. This information could be subject to a reasonable 
fee.8 
 
Chapter 2.4.2.5 Protection of vulnerable consumers 
 
The EU Member States choose, for respectable and various reasons, to support vulnerable 
customers in different ways, some by explicitly taking care of them within energy regulations, 
others by incorporating them in the regulation of the social welfare systems or a combination 
of both options. CEER therefore suggests the following change, underlined, in this sentence: 
”In the light of the on-going work in the Citizen’s Energy Forum’s Vulnerable Consumer 
Working Group and of the development of an energy policy for consumers, we can observe 
here that additional protective measures for vulnerable consumers are justified; in fact, a 
basis already exists in the framework of the internal market for electricity (EC, 2009c; EC, 
2010a):” This does not hinder Member States for protecting vulnerable customers through 
the regulation of social welfare systems, or through specific measures or a combination of 
both option. 
 
      Chapter 3 Need for an adequate range of intermediaries 
 
General comment: From the customer point of view it is important to understand what a 
future scenario would look like, in light of the different intermediaries presented in the draft 
report. CEER would therefore suggest adding a figure, possibly after Figure 4, with the 
consumer in the centre, and then showing all the possible contract relations between the 
consumer and the intermediaries by names: supplier etc, not just one (as in Figure 4).  
 
     Chapter 3.5 Recommendations to achieve an adequate range of intermediaries 
 
(1) Licensing scheme: The draft report states that “Currently, there is already a similar 
scheme for suppliers so that any actor willing to provide supply services must fulfil 
certain predefined conditions, which are recognised by the attribution of a license”. 
 
The existence of licenses for suppliers varies across Member states. CEER would therefore 
suggest the following addition: 
“… in some EU countries there is already a similar scheme for suppliers …” 
 
                                               
8
 Final Guidelines of Good Practice on Regulatory Aspects of Smart Metering for Electricity and Gas (Ref: E10-
RMF-29-05, February 2011), recommendation E/G 1 
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(2) Disaggregated billing: CEER believes that the customer should have easy access 
to comprehensive data on his/her consumption and cost. However, the customer 
might not want to receive this information only through the bill, especially when 
frequency of billing is annual. The customer must be able to choose from different 
communication channels and frequency of information. CEER would therefore 
suggest the following addition: 
 
”The obligation to provide disaggregated billing information frequently enough for 
intermediaries who provide a bundle of services may facilitate the comparison of offers from 
different intermediaries.  
 
(3) Non-discriminatory access to data: The draft report states that “there is the need to 
ensure a non-discriminatory access to data for the different intermediaries. For 
instance, regulation could enforce mandatory information sharing regarding the 
regulated services with all market players and prohibit information transfer from the 
regulated activity to the deregulated activity, so that an integrated DSO would not 
have an information advantage compared to other intermediaries.” 
 
CEER recognises that information sharing is one key factor when considering customers´ 
reliability in the market. Sharing data is important, but it has to be done with the customer in 
the driver seat. CEER would strongly recommend that the draft report take the following into 
account regarding customer control of metering data: 
 
As already mentioned in chapter 2.4.2.4, it is always the customer that chooses in which way 
metering data shall be used and by whom, with the exception of metering data required to 
fulfil regulated duties and within the national market model. The principle should be that the 
party requesting information shall state what information is needed, with what frequency and 
will then obtain the customer’s approval for this. Full transparency on existing customer data 
should be the general principle. For instance, when a service provider is in charge of 
information on the customer’s voltage quality the customer should in this case be able to a) 
know that this data exists, and b) receive information on the explicit data. This information 
could be subject to a reasonable fee. 
 
Due to the importance of reliability, CEER would suggest the following addition: 
“Moreover, there is the need to ensure a non-discriminatory access to data for the different 
intermediaries, after consumer consent. 
 
(4) Independent dispute resolution mechanisms: CEER recommends the following 
improvements for an effective Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)9:  
 
1. ADR bodies must work to ensure customers know this tool is available to assist them by 
communicating widely on the availability of ADR;  
2. Customers should contact the trader in the first instance when they have a complaint. ADR 
should be used if the trader/customer cannot resolve the complaint;  
3. The independence and integrity of the ADR body should be ensured, to promote 
customers’ trust in the process. The ADR body’s funding should be transparent; 
                                               
9CEER Position Paper on the Commission proposal Directive on Consumer ADR, COM(2011) 793, 12 March 
2012 
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4. The branding of ADR bodies and any trader complaint handling and complaints services 
should be distinct and not create any confusion for customers;  
5. It is important to ensure ADR systems operate efficiently and provide value for money; and  
6. Where a trader is part of a vertically-integrated company, relevant authorities should 
monitor closely whether this affects customers‟ rights and market competition market.  
 
CEER suggests that these six aspects are added in the draft report. 
 
 
     Chapter 5.2 Recommendations 
 
The draft report states that ”Before intervention at any level is to be considered, well-
functioning markets can already provide some elements needed for the transition to active 
demand response”. CEER recognises that well-functioning markets need cost-reflective 
prerequisites, among which the absence of non-conflicting end-user prise regulation is one. 
Since that is closely linked to the efficient development of demand response schemes, CEER 
suggest that this is highlighted in chapter 5.2. 
 
Furthermore, CEER welcomes that guidance in the form of good practice codes can be 
developed.  
 
The draft report suggests that “transparency rules for contracts and billing information should 
be developed. National authorities must ensure that consumers have access to 
disaggregated billing information when demand response is bundled with other service offers 
to allow them to evaluate the performance of their contract selection and to compare it with 
other contracts on the market”.  
 
CEER supports the customers´ right to access to disaggregated data, and we would 
especially like to stress that having access to data a) does not necessarily mean that it must 
be presented only on the bill, the customer may prefer to have it on a customised website for 
example, and b) is not automatically the same thing as easily available or possible to 
understand - simplicity is sought and must be emphasised. In this regard, European 
Regulators issued the following recommendations10: 
 
Information on actual consumption and costs, on a monthly basis, free of 
charge: This recommendation only covers information, not billing. We believe that the 
customer (as well as those that both generate and consume electricity) should be 
properly informed - at least once a month - of actual electricity consumption and 
costs. This information should be free of charge. This enables the customer to 
regulate electricity consumption. With remote data reading through smart meters, 
information should be easily available and should be transmitted monthly to the 
relevant market actor. 
 
When communicating with the customer, the service provider should offer a choice of 
different channels to provide this information for free (e.g. sms, internet, call centre). 
Service providers need to take into account other means of communication such as 
paper. This could be offered at a reasonable fee. Vulnerable customers will need to 
                                               
10
 GGP on Regulatory Aspects of Smart Metering for Electricity and Gas. Ref: E10-RMF-29-05 
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be especially taken into account. We do not state in this report which service provider 
should provide this information. The information must be presented in a customer-
friendly way, bearing in mind that customers’ understanding of the electricity market is 
key for their confidence and active participation. 
 
Access to information on consumption and cost data on customer demand: 
On demand, the customer (as well as those that both generate and consume 
electricity) should be able to access information on his/her up to date consumption 
and injection data and costs. When communicating with the customer, the service 
provider should offer a choice of different channels to provide this information for free 
(e.g. sms, internet, call centre). Service providers need to take into account other 
means of communication such as paper. This could be offered at a reasonable fee. 
Vulnerable customers will need to be especially taken into account. Concerning 
historical data, customers as well as those that both generate and consume electricity 
should have access to data at a frequency set nationally, free of charge. 
 
 
CEER suggest revising the following in the draft report: 
 
“Transparency rules for contracts, billing, consumption and cost information should be 
developed. National authorities must ensure that consumers have easy access to 
disaggregated billing information when demand response is bundled with other service offers 
to allow them to evaluate the performance of their contract selection and to compare it with 
other contracts on the market. When communicating with the customer, the service provider 
should offer a choice of different channels to provide this information for free (e.g. sms, 
internet, call centre). Service providers need to take into account other means of 
communication such as paper.” 
 
Concerning the need for new alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, we have already 
stated the following above:  
 
1. ADR bodies must work to ensure customers know this tool is available to assist them by 
communicating widely on the availability of ADR;  
2. Customers should contact the trader in the first instance when they have a complaint. ADR 
should be used if the trader/customer cannot resolve the complaint;  
3. The independence and integrity of the ADR body should be ensured, to promote 
customers’ trust in the process. The ADR body’s funding should be transparent; 
4. The branding of ADR bodies and any trader complaint handling and complaints services 
should be distinct and not create any confusion for customers;  
5. It is important to ensure ADR systems operate efficiently and provide value for money; and  
6. Where a trader is part of a vertically-integrated company, relevant authorities should 
monitor closely whether this affects customers‟ rights and market competition market.  
 
Concerning the national need for introducing new consumer protection measures, CEER 
recognises that some countries may already have these measures in place (through data 
protection regulation, etc.). CEER therefore suggests adding the following: 
“Fourth, national authorities should be required to investigate the need to introduce new 
consumer protection measures – to ensure adequate levels of data protection as well as to 
set up default schemes and if deemed necessary additional protection for vulnerable 
customers.” 
 
  
Ref: C13-CRM-69-05 
 
12/12 
Concerning the licensing conditions, CEER recognises that some countries have licenses for 
suppliers, other do not. Before deciding on a mandatory licensing system, the benefits for the 
customers need to be investigated. How do countries that have a licensing system monitor 
the behaviour of the supplier? How common is it that a license is retracted due to bad 
behaviour? What are the criteria for receiving a licence? How much trust can a customer put 
in a once licensed supplier? What are the costs for administration? Etc. CEER therefore 
suggests that the paragraph is changed to reflect the need for analysis. 
 
Concerning disaggregated data, please see previous page. 
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